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PLEAS OF GUILTY AND THE LOSS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE 
CURRENT PRICE OF PLEADING 
GUILTY 
Stephen A. Saltzburg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Few of the Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions con-
cern court watchers more than those limiting the opportunities of 
defendants who plead guilty to raise constitutional claims in subse-
quent attacks upon their convictions.1 The Court has expressly rec-
ognized that federal courts and many state courts want a defendant's 
guilty plea to be a final, binding adjudication; that, with respect to 
the opportunity to raise post-conviction claims, federal and state 
courts may constitutionally favor those defendants who go to trial 
over those who plead guilty; and, therefore, that a defendant who 
pleads guilty cannot later raise many of the constitutional claims that 
he could have had he chosen to fight rather than settle.2 In fact, 
• Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1967, Dickinson College; J.D. 1970, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.-Ed. 
l. See, e.g., the three cases often referred to as the "Brady trilogy": Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790 (1970). Perhaps the most thorough attack on the opinions is Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court, the .Defense Allorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLO. L. REV. l (1975). See 
also Alschuler, The .Defense Allorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Dix, 
Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief ar More Careful Analysis, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 193 (1977); 
Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: .Disquiet in 
the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. l (1970); Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present but 
Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 
1435 (1974). Professor Israel has commented upon the frequency with which these opinions 
are attacked. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren 
Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1357-58 (1977). 
2. For example, in the Brady trilogy, see note l supra, the claims barred by guilty 
pleas-challenges to death penalties applicable only to defendants standing trial (Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)), and 
challenges to the voluntariness of confessions (McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), 
and Parker}---all could have been raised and preserved had the defendants gone to trial. All 
the defendants could have been tried despite their pleas, since not every guilty plea must be 
accepted. In fact, rules the Supreme Court has approved indicate that the government has an 
interest in going to trial even when individual citizens have no such interest. See, e.g., FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11. Although the Court recognizes plea bargaining as legitimate, see, e.g., Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require 
that a court accept a particular bargained-for plea. See, e.g., United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 
805 (4th Cir. 1978). In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a constitutional right 
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unless he pleads in a jurisdiction that explicitly preserves certain 
constitutional claims after a guilty plea, he presumptively loses his 
claims once the plea is accepted. 3 If .finality is the goal, the Court 
promotes it, but not as well as it did several years ago, for recent 
Supreme Court opinions provide that in all jurisdictions, even those 
most desiring finality, some claims survive a guilty plea and are 
never lost.4 The Supreme Court has held, in effect, that defendants 
may plead guilty under local law and still preserve the right to raise 
certain constitutional claims after pleading. However, the Court has 
had difficulty distinguishing between the many constitutional claims 
that are lost following a guilty plea and the few that are not. 
Commentators have not hesitated to point out the inadequacy of 
the Court's efforts,S yet they have given the Justices little help in lo-
cating the elusive line for which they search. This dearth of aid is 
understandable in view of the discomfort many feel at the notion 
that constitutional rights may be lost through guilty pleas made 
without what they regard as a traditional knowing and intelligent 
waiver 6 and in view of the general dissatisfaction with bargained-for 
pleas.7 Until recently, then, the literature has offered no rationale for 
the Court's rulings. Therefore, Professor Westen's attempt in this 
journal last year to fill that void was most welcome.8 He suggested 
th?,t a defendant who pleads guilty loses all constitutional claims ex-
cept those that, "if asserted before trial, would forever preclude the 
state from obtaining a valid conviction against him."9 The defen-
dant retains those few claims, Professor Westen explained, because 
to plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). However, this Article suggests 
that a court may have to accept a plea in some circumstances whether or not bargaining has 
occurred, although the main focus of the Article is on jurisdictions which encourage pleas and 
want them to be as final as possible. 
3. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). Judicial decisions as well as statutes 
can provide that certain claims survive guilty pleas. See note 142 i'!fra and accompanying 
text. 
4. See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 
U.S. 21 (1974). Such claims are never lost, that is, if certain procedural requirements are 
satisfied. See note 137 i'!fra. 
5. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Allorney, and the Guilty Plea, 41 U. 
COLO. L. REV. I, 13-21 (1975); Dix, supra note I, at 240-45; Westen, Away ftom Waiver: A 
Rationale far the Fo,:feiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH, L. REV. 
1214, 1219-26 (1977). 
6. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at 2 ("I conclude that the Court has abandoned desira-
ble concepts of waiver in guilty-plea cases"). Professor Westen concludes that Alschuler "as-
sumes that these decisions must be understood in traditional terms of waiver." Westen, supra 
note 5, at 1216 n.2. But Alschuler argues only that they are best understood in those terms, not 
that other analyses are impossible. 
1. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at ll, 51-70. 
8. See Westen, supra note 5. 
9. Id. at 1226. 
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setting aside the defendant's conviction in light of one of those 
claims leaves the state "in no worse a position with respect to its 
ability to obtain a valid conviction against the defendant at trial than 
it occupied before entry of the plea."10 
This Article proposes the same basic rule as Westen's to explain 
the Supreme Court's decisions, but for very different reasons which 
require several modifications of the Westen rule. I argue that all the 
guilty-plea cases, properly viewed, are consistent with, and therefore 
can be read as evidence of, a theory more easily applied than articu-
lated by the Court: that some constitutional rights are largely pre-
mised on notions of litigation avoidance, that their "avoidance" 
rationales must be respected, and that these rights therefore prevent 
governments from establishing procedural rules that force criminal 
defendants to go to trial-to choose more rather than less expensive 
means-to claim them. 11 The rule of thumb is that defendants may 
plead guilty and yet preserve constitutional claims which, if sus-
tained, would bar any litigation of the charges against them. Forcing 
defendants to go to trial to assert such claims negates their value and 
is intolerable. Hence, defendants wishing to raise double jeopardy 
and closely related claims, some speedy trial claims, and arguably 
certain attacks on the constitutionality of substantive criminal stat-
utes that proscribe conduct beyond the power of the state to punish 
legitimately, cannot be forced to incur the costs of trial to assert that 
the Constitution bars the state from proceeding at all with its 
charges. Rather, defendants may plead guilty and then assert these 
claims. Other claims-those not substantially concerned with avoid-
ing litigation and its attendant costs-may be barred following a 
guilty plea. 
Because this Article asserts that the Court's holdings sometimes 
deserve more respect than the Court's rationales, we must retread 
some of the familiar ground that the Westen article covers. Some 
10. Id. at 1235. 
11. There are numerous reasons why trials can be more costly to defendants than guilty 
pleas. Several examples are offered here. First, various court costs may be imposed on a 
convicted defendant after trial. Second, some courts will require the defendant to be present 
during trial, which obviously means that the defendant cannot engage in profit-generating 
activities. Third, trials may involve delays which might keep a defendant who cannot make 
bail incarcerated and away from work in a case in which the court ultimately will impose 
probation after conviction. Also, the defendant who goes to trial might be sentenced more 
severely than ifhe pleaded guilty. Thus, the defendant who wishes to urge that he should not 
be involved in litigation at all risks a more severe sentence (plainly a cost) by going to trial. 
This is true for all defendants who want to retain constitutional claims and thus do not plead 
guilty, but there is something special about litigation avoidance rights: if the holders go to trial 
to preserve the claims, the rights are violated and some of the costs can never be recouped. 
Other rights can better be vindicated by appellate courts, although no remedy is ever perfect. 
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reiteration is necessary not only to clarify the Court's unifying 
theme, but also to explain it. Part I traces the Court's doctrinal de-
velopments chronologically. The opinions are examined meticu-
lously and critically, since the defects in the Court's reasoning must 
be discussed to derive the theory that justifies the distinctions among 
rights drawn by the cases, whether or not the Court had that theory 
in mind. Once the problems with the Court's various approaches are 
identified, the need for additional thought should be plain. Those 
who need not be persuaded that the guilty plea cases are muddled 
and who know them all too well can quickly traverse Part I and ad-
dress the heart of the Article, set forth in Parts II and III, without 
delay. 
Part II examines Westen's thesis and shows that it must be articu-
lated somewhat differently if it is to withstand analysis. Part III pro-
pounds modifications of the Westen rule and a very different 
rationale for it. More importantly, perhaps, it suggests that the the-
ory of the cases more closely comports with traditional waiver doc-
trine than has previously been recognized, even by the Justices 
themselves. 
The Article concludes in Part IV that in several important cases 
the Court, because of its erroneous assumptions about various de-
fendants' states of concern, actually misapplied the theory that best 
distinguishes between claims that survive guilty pleas and those that 
do not. Finally, the Article makes a point that some may find sur-
prising: once the guilty plea cases are properly understood and once 
defendants who plea-bargain know what the cases stand for, we may 
find that the very decisions intended to promote plea bargaining ac-
tually undermine public acceptance of bargaining because they 
lessen the punishment imposed upon serious offenders who plead 
guilty. 
I. THE Loss OF OPPORTUNITIES To RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CLAIMS: DECISIONS IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE 
A. Closing the .Door to Constitutional Claims 
Although commentators disagree about which of the guilty plea 
decisions is most significant, 12 they generally consider the Brady tril-
ogy13 central. We may begin this discussion with the case that gave 
12. Compare Alschuler, supra note 5, at 51, with Israel, supra note I, at 1359. 
13. See note I supra. After this section examines the Brady trilogy, further references to 
the cases will not be accompanied by citations. As the Article progresses, most major cases will 
be discussed on the assumption that they are sufficiently few that the reader can keep them in 
mind. 
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the trilogy its name, .Brady v. United States. 14 Brady was charged 
with kidnapping under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 15 which then 
authorized the death penalty "if the verdict of the jury shall so rec-
ommend" or, alternatively, imprisonment for any term up to life. 
Since the trial judge was apparently unwilling to try the case without 
a jury, 16 Brady faced an unhappy choice: plead guilty to avoid any 
possibility of the death sentence or go to trial and risk the jury's de-
termination not only of guilt, but also whether to impose the death 
sentence. Brady pleaded guilty. Thereafter, the Supreme Court de-
cided in United States v. Jackson 11 that the Federal Kidnapping 
Act's death penalty provision unconstitutionally infringed a defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Before the Supreme 
Court's decision in Jackson, but after a lower court had dismissed 
Jackson's indictment, Brady attacked his conviction collaterally, 18 
arguing that the unconstitutional death-penalty provision had im-
properly coerced him to plead guilty. Although the district court 
found that Brady had not pleaded guilty "by reason of the statute," 19 
and the court of appeals affirmed,20 the Supreme Court was willing 
to "assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for the 
death penalty provision."21 
But the Court held that this assumption did not mean that the 
conviction was unconstitutionally tainted. Noting the absence of 
"evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or 
hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of coun-
sel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the ad-
vantages of pleading guilty,"22 the Court held that Brady had 
pleaded voluntarily and with the help of counsel. It held also that 
Brady had pleaded intelligently: he was mentally competent, "[h]e 
14. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
15. Federal Kidnapping Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 760 (amended in 1972 to 
remove the death penalty provision; current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1976)). 
16. 397 U.S. at 743. Although it is reasonable to insist that the prosecutor consent to a 
waiver of jury trial, especially when the judge has life tenure and is not easily challenged, see 
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), it is not necessarily reasonable to permit a judge, as 
does FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a), to deny both sides the 9pportunity to waive a jury. q. United 
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (restricting judicial discretion to reject a 
guilty plea condoned by the prosecutor). 
17. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). 
19. 397 U.S. at 749 n.7. 
20. 404 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1968). 
21. 397 U.S. at 750. 
22. 397 U.S. at 750. 
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was advised by competent counsel,"23 and he was not legally entitled 
"to withdraw his plea merely because he discovered long after the 
plea had been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality 
of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative 
courses of action."24 Thus, the dual requirements of a voluntary and 
intelligent decision were satisfied.25 Three Justices who concurred in 
the result26 would have distinguished permissible (ie., legal) pres-
sure put on a defendant to admit guilt, such as the prosecution's 
mustering of a strong case, from impermissible (i e. , illegal) pressure, 
such as that applied by an unconstitutional penalty provision.27 But 
they would have found this plea valid in light of the district court's, 
findings. 
Parker v. North Caro!ina,28 the second case of the trilogy, in-
volved an issue similar to that in Brady. The defendant, charged 
with the capital offense of first-degree burglary and forced to choose 
between a trial before a jury that could return the death sentence and 
a plea to a judge who could not,29 chose to plead.30 A majority of 
the Supreme Court assumed that Jackson invalidated the sentencing 
scheme31 but held that, as in Brady, the plea was not invalid simply 
23. 397 U.S. at 756. At several points in its opinion the majority emphasized counsel's 
competence. 
24. 397 U.S. at 757. For the majority, Brady involved the traditional principles for deter-
mining both the general validity of using a defendant's actions against him and the specific 
validity of guilty pleas. 397 U.S. at 747-48, & nn.4-6, citing inter alia Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 (1969), and Brook.hart v. Janis, 384 U.S. I (1966) (a "slow plea" case). 
25. See note 24 supra. 
26. Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices Douglas and Marshall, concluded 
that the lower courts were not clearly erroneous in finding that the statute did not induce 
Brady's plea. For an incisive attack on this position, see Alschuler, supra note 5, at 57 n.187. 
27. Accord Dix, supra note 1, at 243-46. flut see Alschuler, supra note 5, at 58-70. 
28. 397 U.S. 790 (1970). 
29. Apparently North Carolina law required that the case be tried to a jury. 397 U.S. at 
792 n.1. Although the federal statute in Brady allowed both bench and jury trials, 397 U.S. at 
743 n.l, the trial judge refused to hear the case without a jury. 
30. Death penalties may have been somewhat more likely following jury trials under 
North Carolina law than under the federal statute considered in Brady, since the latter re-
quired that the jury specially recommend death, signifying perhaps that life was the presump-
tive sentence. The presumptive sentence in North Carolina was death. 
31. The Court chose somewhat strange language, saying only, "It may be that under 
United States v. Jackson ... it was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty under the 
statutory framework which existed in North Carolina at the time of Parker's plea." 397 U.S. at 
794-95 (footnote omitted). Nowhere did the Court make clear what difference it saw between 
Brady and Parker. Presumably, the difference was that North Carolina threatened all defen-
dants who went to trial with the death penalty, whereas the federal scheme presented a capital 
threat only to those who elected or were forced to have a jury, as opposed to a judge, trial. 
Thus, the unconstitutionality of the scheme was, despite Justice Brennan's dissent, not "ines-
capable." 397 U.S. at 813 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Possibly the Court was not more forth-
coming because it wished to avoid another question concerning the voluntariness of Parker's 
plea. Had the Court decided that a death penalty threat to all those who stood trial did not 
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because the penalty scheme was.32 
Parker involved a second issue which was identical to that raised 
and more carefully considered in the third case of the trilogy, Mc-
Mann v. Richardson:33 ''whether and to what extent an otherwise 
valid guilty plea may be impeached in collateral proceedings by as-
sertions or proof that the plea was motivated by a prior coerced con-
fession."34 After noting that the case involved neither the claim that 
counsel had been denied nor that the circumstances coercing the 
confession had had an "abiding impact"35 that tainted the plea, the 
Court asked whether a showing that the defendant would not have 
pleaded had he not been coerced to confess could nullify the plea. 
The Court answered that a defendant who relinquishes a trial, who 
abandons the opportunity to challenge his confession at or before 
trial or on any appeal, and who admits guilt "to take the benefits of a 
plea, if any,"36 hardly acts involuntarily. "[W]hether his plain by-
pass of state remedies was an intelligent act depends on whether he 
was so incompetently advised . . . that the Constitution will afford 
him another chance to plead."37 As long as counsel provides "rea-
sonably competent advice,"38 a defendant may not attack his plea on 
the ground that his counsel misjudged the admissibility of the con-
penalize the right to jury trial, the Court would have had to focus on whether this scheme was 
more coercive of guilty pleas than was the federal statute and, if it was, whether the additional 
coercion was acceptable. Apparently the Court in Parker ignored the fact that it left the possi-
bility open in Brady that a death penalty or other punishment scheme could be so coercive as 
effectively to deny a defendant free choice. Of course, the Court did not find the Brady scheme 
as coercive as that. But by failing to note the features that made the North Carolina scheme 
arguably harsher than the one in Brady (see notes 29 & 30 supra) and that thus made it argua-
bly unconstitutional, the Court avoided the question whether the incremental pressure to plead 
exerted on a North Carolina defendant nudged that penalty system over the fine line separat-
ing the permissible (Brady) from the impermissible. It still is not clear when a penalty scheme 
becomes too coercive. See generally Co=onwealth v. Nickol, 476 Pa. 75, 381 A.2d 873 
(1977); Commonwealth v. Bhillips, 475 Pa. 427, 380 A.2d 1210 (1977). Also compare Lockett v. 
Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2971 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring), with 98 S. Ct. at 2976 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). For the latest word by the Supreme Court, see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct: 
492 (1978). 
32. In this portion of the Parker opinion, the Court noted that the defendant "had the 
advice of retained counsel ... for the month before he pleaded." 397 U.S. at 796 (1970). In 
the second major part of its opinion, concerning the significance of Parker's allegedly coerced 
confession on his plea, the Court reiterated that "the advice he received was well within the 
range of competence required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases." 397 
U.S. at 797-98. 
33. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). After the three McMann defendants had entered their pleas, New 
York enacted statutes allowing some constitutional claims to be raised after a guilty plea. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 
34. 397 U.S. at 760. 
35. 397 U.S. at 767. 
36. 397 U.S. at 768. 
37. 397 U.S. at 768-69. 
38. 397 U.S. at 770. 
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fession.39 Furthermore, the Court held it irrelevant that the pleas 
being challenged had been made when it was the practice of state 
courts to abstain from independently determining the voluntariness 
of a confession, a practice which was subsequently declared uncon-
stitutional.40 The majority said: 
It is no denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant 
waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under 
the law then existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in 
either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts.41 
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority's almost exclusive 
emphasis on the adequacy of counsel; he maintained that a guilty 
plea induced by a coerced confession becomes the tainted fruit of the 
poisonous tree,42 especially in a system which lacks adequate proce-
dures for challenging confessions and which thereby encourages de-
fendants to avoid trials.43 Justice Brennan, as in Brady and Parker, 
would have inquired not only into the defendant's knowing decision 
to plead, but also into the reasons for that decision.44 And he would 
have held that a defendant could not lose a claim like that raised in 
39. 397 U.S. at 770. 
40. Jackson v. Denno, 387 U.S. 368 (1964). As Justice Brennan's McMann dissent noted, 
Jackson has been applied retroactively. 397 U.S. at 783. Prior to Jackson, the state courts, 
rather than independently determining voluntariness, had required that the government pre-
sent a prima facie case of voluntariness and then had submitted the issue to the jury with an 
instruction to disregard an involuntary confession. 
41. 397 U.S. at 774. The majority feared that "[t]he alternative would be a per se constitu-
tional rule invalidating all New York guilty pleas that were motivated by confessions and that 
were entered prior to Jackson." 397 U.S. at 774. But it is more than slightly plausible that 
only pleas motivated by involuntary confessions would be tainted, since defendants who had 
confessed voluntarily were correct in believing that trial juries would learn that. Doubtless, 
numerous hearings might have been needed to decide the voluntariness of pleas, but that con-
cern differs from the one expressed by the majority. That concern might have been assuaged 
by requiring a defendant who pleaded guilty to allege specific facts supporting a claim of 
coercion. See, e.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Even the limited open-
ing implicitly recognized by the Court for post-plea challenges-where the coercion inducing 
the confession has a lingering effect-could require hearings when such allegations are made. 
42. Justice Brennan cited Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), which held that a 
defendant's testimony at a previous trial made in response to the introduction of three invalid 
confessions must be deemed a fruit of the poisonous tree. Although Justice White's dissent in 
Harrison offered Justice Brennan's position some support, 392 U.S. at 234, Harrison had less 
precedential value than the dissenters realized. If the defendant's constitutional claim prevails 
at or before a trial, some remedy presumably must be provided. Suppressing all fruits of the 
poisonous tree is one of many available remedies. The question of what remedy is most appro-
priate had to be reached in Harrison. But McMann raised a threshold question: should a 
guilty plea be considered an abandonment of the constitutional claim, an abandonment which 
makes it unnecessary for the court to reach the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree issue? 
43. Justice Brennan argued that the McMann majority actually made Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 (1964), only partially retroactive despite the Court's previous assertions that 
Jackson was to be fully retroactive. See cases cited at 397 U.S. at 783 n.7. But obviously he 
was begging the real question, which was whether one who pleaded guilty abandoned or lost 
the Jackson claim. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined his opinion. 
44. 397 U.S. at 784. 
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McMann-respecting the New York procedures for evaluating con-
fessions-when the defendant had no way to foresee that he might 
some day have a valid challenge under a future Supreme Court 
case.45 
Tollett v. Henderson46 followed the Brady trilogy. The Supreme 
Court held there that a defendant who pleaded guilty to first-degree 
murder could not challenge in subsequent federal habeas corpus 
proceedings the racial composition of the grand jury that had in-
dicted him.47 The state effectively conceded that it had systemati-
cally discriminated on the basis of race in its grand jury selection, 
but, it said, Henderson had not objected within the time prescribed 
by state law. Although Henderson testified that he had been una-
ware of the discrimination and of his ability to challenge it, and al-
though his attorney's affidavit supported him, the Supreme Court 
relied on Brady for the following principle: 
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has pre-
ceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has sol-
emnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense 
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 
prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary 
and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice 
he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in 
McMann.48 
Thus, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings, includ-
ing an inquiry into whether Henderson's attorney had rendered rea-
sonably competent advice. 
Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Douglas and 
Brennan, argued in dissent that the majority was extending the 
Brady rationale by applying it where a defendant had not simply 
"misjudged the possibility of successfully raising constitutional chal-
lenges to the pretrial proceedings,"49 but "where counsel did not 
consider and present to his client the possibility of a challenge to the 
composition of the grand jury."50 According to the dissenters, Hen-
derson's counsel either failed to inquire adequately into the grand 
jury's composition or he failed to report adequately the results of 
that inquiry to his client. These facts, said the minority, hardly con-
45. 397 U.S. at 785. 
46. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
47. Henderson did not bring his federal claim until twenty years after his plea. His 99-year 
sentence resulted from a bargain made to avoid the death penalty. 
48. 411 U.S. at 267. 
49. 411 U.S. at 270. 
50. 411 U.S. at 270. 
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stituted a waiver or adequate representation by counsel;51 the de-
fendant had not voluntarily and knowingly foregone a constitutional 
claim, since he was unaware of it when he pleaded.52 
B. Nudging Open the .Door 
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court assumed that the govern-
ment accepted the guilty pleas to promote finality and judicial and 
prosecutorial efficiency (as well as to protect defendants from the va-
garies of trial). As was suggested in the Introduction, the four deci-
sions served those goals well. Following the Brady trilogy and 
Tollett, therefore, one fairly might have assumed that a guilty plea 
entered with the advice of competent counsel would be unchallenge-
able53 ( except perhaps where special state rules expressly permitted 
challenges even after the defendant had tendered a plea and the 
court had accepted it).54 Whatever else might be said about that ap-
proach to collateral remedies, it provides a clear-cut rule to clarify 
for federal district judges the proper scope of collateral proceedings 
and to reduce both the number of state court cases reaching federal 
courts and the number of collateral attacks by federal prisoners. 
However, subsequent Supreme Court cases indicate that more must 
be said: the Constitution requires that some claims be heard despite 
the off er and acceptance of a guilty plea. In fact, not long after 
51. Tollett is another of the cases in which a fear of the death penalty partly induced the 
guilty plea. Although a plurality of the Supreme Court insisted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 199 (1976), that using the death penalty as a bargaining chip in plea bargaining does not 
invite the kind of arbitrariness condemned in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), there is 
reason to believe that the death penalty is popular among prosecutors because of the hydraulic 
pressure it exerts upon defendants to plead. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978). 
One point that has received little attention is the impact of a capital sanction upon the defense 
attorney's legal advice. Although one might assume that lawyers whose own lives are not at 
stake would be less averse to risk than their clients, the lawyer's role as fiduciary, the growing 
number of malpractice suits, and the greater burdens of trying a case with life or death conse-
quences may distort a lawyer's judgment in advising clients. More cynical observers might 
suggest that busy public defenders or underpaid appointed lawyers are likely to want to avoid 
the complexities of a capital trial in order to tum to other work. 
52. Probably the majority opinion too quickly conceded that the Brady trilogy is distin-
guishable from Henderson's case because "the facts giving rise to the constitutional claims [in 
the trilogy] were generally known to the defendants and their attorneys prior to the entry of the 
guilty pleas." 411 U.S. at 266. It is not clear that the facts known to the defendants in the 
Brady trilogy included "facts" about the relevant state courts' procedures in ruling on confes-
sion claims or about the possible unconstitutionality of the death penalty statutes. Perhaps the 
last "fact" is more properly characterized as "law," but the point remains that the Brady tril-
ogy defendants may not have known all the details about challenges to the death penalty 
provisions or about the procedure used by some state courts to handle preliminary questions of 
fact. 
53. Plainly the competence of counsel could be challenged under the decisions. 
54. See the discussion of Lefkowitz v. Newsome in note 137 infra. This exception was left 
open in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 n.13 (1970). 
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Tollett the Court indicated that "no subsequent challenge" was not 
what it had in mind. In 1974, the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision in 
Blackledge v. Perry55 opened the door to some collateral challenges 
and created lasting confusion about the distinction between the 
Brady cases and Tollett on the one hand and Blackledge on the 
other. 
The facts of Blackledge hardly presaged its eventual place in the 
Supreme Court reports. Perry, a North Carolina prison inmate, was 
convicted in a bench trial of a misdemeanor assault with a deadly 
weapon. He received a six-month sentence, to be tacked to the term 
he was then serving. Taking advantage of the state's trial de novo 
system, Perry appealed to the trial court of general jurisdiction. 56 
The prosecutor responded by obtaining a felony indictment for the 
assault. After pleading guilty, Perry received five to seven years, to 
be served concurrently with the sentence he was already serving. 
This sentence increased Perry's potential confinement by seventeen 
months rather than by the six months the lower court's consecutive 
sentence required.57 Perry challenged the prosecutor's tactic of in-
dicting him for a higher offense following his appeal. The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court's decision that the state had twice 
placed Perry in jeopardy and that Perry's guilty plea did not pre-
clude him from raising his claims. The Supreme Court majority 
agreed that its decision in North Carolina v. Pearce58 meant that the 
prosecutor, in seeking the higher indictment, had an impermissible 
opportunity for vindictiveness and thus denied Perry due process of 
law. 
The Court previously had dealt with North Carolina's plea sys-
tem in Parker, one of the Brady trilogy. Therefore, it must have 
assumed in Blackledge, as it had in Parker, that the state wanted 
guilty pleas to be conclusive and final. The Court nonetheless 
agreed with the lower courts that Perry's guilty plea did not bar his 
55. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Justice Rehnquist dissented on three grounds. Justice Powell 
joined that portion of the dissent which discussed the impact of the guilty plea. 
56. "When an appeal is taken, the statutory scheme provides that the slate is wiped clean; 
the prior conviction is annulled, and the prosecution and the defense begin anew in the Supe-
rior Court," which is a higher court. 417 U.S. at 22. 
57. 417 U.S. at 23 n.2. 
58. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce held that due process was violated when, following a 
criminal defendant's successful appeal and unsuccessful retrial, the trial judge, without stating 
specific, justificatory findings in the record, levied a greater penalty than he had at the initial 
sentencing. The Blackledge Court distinguished Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), 
which upheld a greater sentence imposed after a de novo trial in a higher court, and Chaffin v. 
Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), which held Pearce inapplicable to jury sentencing so long as 
the jury is uninformed of a defendant's prior sentence. 
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due process claim, and it purported to distinguish Blackledge from 
the Brady trilogy and Tollett as follows: 
Although the underlying claims presented in Tolle/I and the Brady tril-
ogy were of constitutional dimensions, none went to the very power of 
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him. . . . In the case at hand, by contrast, . . . 
[h]aving chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in 
the District Court, the State of North Carolina was ... simply pre-
cluded by the Due Process Clause from calling upon the respondent to 
answer to the more serious charge in the Superior Court. . . . [T]he 
right that [the defendant] asserts and that we today accept is the right 
not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.59 
The Blackledge dissenters had difficulty deciphering the majority 
opinion. The commentators have found it equally difficult. Both 
have as~ed what the Court meant when it said that neither the 
claims in the Brady cases nor in Tollett "went to the very power of 
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him." Justice Rehnquist properly noted that the 
state had no power to convict in Tollett if the indictment was consti-
tutionally invalid.60 Thus, if the majority's point was that a defen-
dant can attack, after his guilty plea, a mistake in the origination of 
the proceedings, it had decided Tollett wrongly. . 
There is another reading of the Blackledge opinion that is not 
confined to initiating criminal actions. If the opinion is read broadly 
enough to allow defendants to challenge convictions on any ground 
that would invalidate them, virtually any constitutional claim would 
be permissible on collateral review, since all nonharmless constitu-
tional errors bar conviction.61 Such a reading62 would effectively 
S9. 417 U.S. at 30. Apparently, the Court considered it significant that the prosecutor did 
not go straight to the grand jury even though he could have. 417 U.S. at 29 n.7. Moreover, 
that the prosecutor could have bargained with the defendant prior to filing any charges or to 
seeking grand jury action did not suggest to the Court that it should view the first trial as the 
prosecutor's "opening bid" in the bargaining. Reading Blackledge v. Perry in conjunction with 
the more recent Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 3S7 (1978), it seems that prior to commence-
ment of trial or a guilty plea, the Court will not insist that prosecutors and grand juries con-
form to their publicly announced decisions, although the same sort of "vindictiveness" 
condemned in Pearce and Blackledge may constitutionally occur in negotiations that are never 
formalized in open court. The appearance of vindictiveness is to be avoided, but only some-
times. See generally United States v. Groves, S71 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978). 
60. 417 U.S. at 35-36. 
61. Even some errors that are in fact harmless may compel reversal on appeal if the appel-
late court presumes there was harm and refuses to engage in ad hoc review of particular cases. 
See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
62. Professor Westen has asserted that the trouble with this broad reading "is that it goes 
too far, for one can scarcely think of a constitutional claim that precludes the state from ob-
taining a valid conviction without regard to whether the defendant himself asserts it as a de-
fense." Westen, supra note 5, at 1221. This misses the point, however. There are claims 
which, I believe, probably bar a valid conviction whether or not raised by a defendant and 
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overrule the Brady line of cases, which clearly was not the intent of 
the Blackledge majority. 
Still another reading of Blackledge emphasizes the Court's state-
ment that "[u]nlike the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not com-
plaining of 'antecedent constitutional violations' or of a 'deprivation 
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty 
plea.' "63 Thus, the reading suggests, only claims stemming from 
constitutional violations that occur at the time or after the guilty plea 
is entered may be raised collaterally. But this reading makes little 
sense, as Professor Alschuler has persuasively argued: 
The defendant's attorney, by filing a motion to dismiss the indictment, 
could have challenged the "contemporaneous" violation of the defen-
dant's rights as easily as he could have challenged any "antecedent" 
violation, but he did not do so. If the entry of a plea of guilty precludes 
inquiry into "antecedent" violations, it is difficult to understand why it 
does not preclude inquiry into "contemporaneous" violations as well. 
If the Court's distinction mattered, moreover, there is a clear sense 
in which the alleged violation of the defendant's rights in Perry was 
antecedent to his plea. The Court emphasized that the defendant 
could not constitutionally have been haled into court, yet the defen-
dant had obviously been indicted and brought into court prior to the 
entry of his plea. . . . 
Finally, it is not at all apparent that the defendants in the prior 
cases were complaining of "antecedent" violations of their rights. In 
McMann, each defendant did, of course, allege that an "antecedent" 
which a defendant cannot waive-e.g., a federal criminal defendant cannot waive the right to 
be tried in an article III court with subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that ab-
sence of subject matter jurisdiction must be raised sua sponte once noticed by a federal court. 
See, e.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 
U.S. 149 (1908); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148 (1834). I doubt whether the defendant 
could waive the right to fundamentally fair procedures in a criminal case, since the very con-
cept of waiver itself assumes a context in which it can fairly be determined that someone is 
validly giving up something. See also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (order 
terminating stay of execution) (White, J., dissenting: "I believe ... that the consent of a con-
victed defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment other-
wise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."); United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 
1978), and United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1978) (federal defendant cannot 
waive jury unanimity requirement). The concept of plain error stands in sharp contrast to the 
Westen thesis. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. l03(d). 
Professor Westen correctly notes that most protections can be waived. The question in 
most guilty plea cases is not whether a defendant can waive a particular right; it is w.hether a 
guilty plea operates as a waiver even though the defendant did not intend it as one. Thus, a 
defendant who raises a collateral attack on the ground that his confession was coerced or on 
any other grounds properly cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings is saying, in effect, "I 
didn't waive anything,'' and the question becomes whether a court can respond with the state-
ment: "Whether you specifically intended to or not, you gave up your right by pleading 
guilty." 
What is wrong with a broad reading of the Blackledge opinion is that it would provide no 
way of distinguishing the Brady cases and Toi/ell from Perry's case, something that the Court 
clearly wanted to do. 
63. 417 U.S. at 30. 
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constitutional violation had occurred at the time that his confession 
was obtained. It was, however, a somewhat different constitutional vi-
olation-one that would occur at trial when the involuntary confession 
was received in evidence-that had allegedly motivated his plea. This 
"contemporaneous" or, perhaps, "threatened subsequent" violation 
supplied the basic grievance. Moreover, there was even more clearly 
no "antecedent" violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in 
Brady v. United States, where the defendant claimed that his guilty 
plea had been induced by the threat that an unconstitutional death 
sentence would be imposed following a trial. 64 
The Court's first attempt to apply the Blackledge rule to different 
facts produced yet one more reading of the Blackledge majority's 
intent. In a footnote to Menna v. New York,65 which held that a 
double jeopardy claim was not lost following a plea of guilty,66 the 
Court attempted to juxtapose that opinion and its precedents. It 
stated first that the Brady trilogy involved antecedent constitutional 
violations,67 second that ''waiver was not the basic ingredient of this 
line of cases,"68 and finally that the 
point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of 
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite 
validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, 
factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the state's imposition of punish-
ment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those consti-
tutional violations not logically inconsistent69 with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt. . . . Here, however, the claim is that the 
state may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt 
is established.70 
64. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 16 n.51. 
65. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
66. Menna was sentenced to 30 days in jail for refusing to testify before a grand jury after a 
court had granted him immunity. Subsequently he was indicted for his refusal to answer ques-
tions before the same grand jury. New York conceded that the 30-day sentence was a criminal 
conviction and the Supreme Court found support in New York law for the proposition that the 
second indictment was for the same crime. Although the Supreme Court considered 
Blackledge a due process case because of the way it had earlier decided North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), its rationale for the due process holding closely resembles that 
supporting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Hence, the holding in 
Menna hardly came as a surprise. In fact, there is every reason to believe that Pearce should 
have been decided on double jeopardy grounds, as Justice Harlan, who wrote separately in 
Pearce, and Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice Marshall, argued in their opinions. 
67. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
68. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
69. I assume that the Court erred in its choice of words. Obviously, it should have said 
"consistent," not "inconsistent." 
70. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2 (emphasis original). Perhaps the Court should have explained what 
"quite validly" meant. Is factual innocence irrelevant once a defendant pleads? Some courts 
have suggested that it might be pertin~nt once a plea is determined to be invalid. See, e.g., 
United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977); State v. Eighth Judicial Dist., --
Mont.--, 575 P.2d 65 (1978). It is arguable that courts should pay more attention to consti-
tutional claims that would establish that one who entered a valid plea is, in fact, innocent. 
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It requires few words to demonstrate that this distinction is unac-
ceptable. The Court's supposed line between "antecedent" and 
other constitutional violations is no better because raised a second 
time. The discussion of factual guilt is equally unpersuasive. It can-
not be squared with Tollett, where the grand jury claim was unre-
lated to factual guilt, and, arguably, it cannot distinguish Menna 
from Brady and Parker, since the challenges to the death-penalty 
schemes concerned not whether Brady and Parker were guilty, but 
whether the statutes could effectively deny them a trial by severely 
pricing the choice of a jury trial. Even McMann can be viewed as 
similar to Menna, since the defendants in McMann raised not only 
the factual and legal questions of the voluntariness of their conf es-
sions, but also the legitimacy of the New York procedures, which 
encouraged defendants to forego trials whether guilty or innocent. 
Indeed, an argument can be made that the Court's own language in 
Menna, quoted above,71 requires that Menna be decided differently, 
since ''the defense of double jeopardy is designed in part to protect 
innocent defendants from being wrongly convicted by means of suc-
cessive prosecutions for the same off ence."72 While not entirely per-
suasive,73 this argument highlights the difficulty of drawing hard and 
fast lines between issues of factual guilt and other issues.74 More-
over, it helps make clear that Menna and Blackledge, though they 
may be consistent, scarcely help identify the line that properly sepa-
rates those constitutional claims that survive a plea of guilty from . 
those that do not.75 
11. See text accompanying note 70 supra. 
72. Westen, supra note 5, at 1224. 
73. Aside from the fact that Menna's second trial followed a conviction, which Professor 
Westen properly notes, id. n.24, this argument is weak indeed, because no need exists to in-
quire into guilt and innocence if a person twice placed in jeopardy properly complains. See 
Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). Even if the evidence is so overwhelming that no one 
could reasonably have even the slightest doubt about the defendant's guilt, the fact that it is the 
prosecution's second try requires that the defendant's claim be sustained. See Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
74. Thus, there are three problems in using "factual guilt" to demarcate between lost and 
preserved claims and in saying that only claims which are unrelated to factual guilt survive 
guilty pleas. First, that analysis does not explain Tollett. Second, it raises the difficult problem 
of determining whether a constitutional claim sufficiently relates to the determination of guilt 
and innocence. Consider, for example, cases in which the Supreme Court has had to decide 
whether to make a constitutional decision retroactive; the Court has recognized that some 
rights affect the determination of guilt or innocence, but not very much. See, e.g., Adams v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Third, that analysis 
forgets that some defendants plead guilty while professing their innocence and often admit 
only that they want whatever benefits a bargain affords. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
75. Professor Westen, supra note 5, at 1227-31, persuasively rejects two other explanations 
of the Court's line drawing: (l) that the Court is attempting to identify those cases in which the 
claimed constitutional violation, which is complained of after the plea, had materially affected 
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II. A NEW RULE TO EXPLAIN THE CASES 
The state of the law respecting the rights foregone after pleading 
guilty is obviously unsatisfactory. Nothing in the language of any of 
the Supreme Court's cases articulates a rule that helps even slightly 
in addressing new cases or evaluating the merits of those already 
decided.76 Some commentators suggest that the Justices should be 
embarrassed because their language does not square with cases de-
cided before 1970.77 Most commentators have been satisfied with 
attacking the Court's work, but recently Professor Westen boldly 
proposed a rule that he believes can explain the Court's work, and he 
suggested how that rule might be applied in cases that have yet to 
reach the Court.78 To distinguish rights that survive guilty pleas and 
the decision to plead and to allow challenges only in such cases; and (2) that the Court is 
attempting to identify those cases in which the state has no interest in preserving a conviction 
and is attempting to allow post-plea constitutional challenges only in such cases. The first 
explanation is inadequate in light of the Court's assumption in Brady about the importance of 
the statute's effect on the plea. In addition, one would have to suppose that, irrespective of the 
nature of the violation, any uncorrected constitutional violation potentially strengthens the 
prosecution's hand and tends to encourage guilty pleas. The second explanation is unaccepl· 
able for obvious reasons: 
In Blackledge itself, for example, the defendant did not go so far as to contend that the 
state had no interest in prosecuting him for the felony of assault with intent to kill; in-
stead, he argued that the state should have charged him with the felony initially, and not 
as a response to his decision to take a de novo appeal from his misdemeanor conviction. 
Similar reasoning applies with regard to other defenses, such as those of double jeopardy, 
speedy trial, and presidential pardon. In each case, although the defense would bar the 
possibility of conviction, it does nothing to abrogate the state's interest in prosecution. 
Thus, far from being cases in which the state has no interest in prosecution, these are cases 
in which the state's interest is merely outweighed by interests of the accused. 
Id. at 1231 (footnote omitted). ' 
Professor Westen has also argued that Menna and Blackledge cannot be squared. Id. al 
1225. It is true that whether the cases are consistent depends on how the cases' confusing 
language is read. I have suggested in the text some of the problems with the language of both 
opinions. Apparently, the Menna court believed it was applying the Blackledge principle and 
perhaps even that it was more clearly articulating that principle. Clarity, however, is not a 
virtue of either opinion. · 
76. Eventually, the Supreme Court might clarify the constitutional strictures relevant to 
the pleading process by deciding so many cases that no issues remain unresolved. In view of 
the Court's workload and its pace thus far, the possibility is remote that adjudication will 
answer in the near future all the questions raised by the cases already decided. Were the 
possibility more proximate, many lower courts would be much relieved, but the fact would 
remain that unless we understand why the Court draws the lines that it does, we cannot ade-
quately evaluate the legitimacy of its decisions. 
77. Consider, for ex~ple, the criticism of the dissenting opinion in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 
U.S. 426 (1975), voiced by Alschuler, supra note 5, at 17-19 (citing earlier Supreme Court 
decisions in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921)) 
and Westen, supra note 5, at 1225-26 n.28 (citing Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.2 
(1968)). The criticisms are mistaken to the extent that they suggest that the dissenting Justices 
could not possibly square their language with the guilty plea cases. See text at notes 105-21 
infra. 
78. For example, Professor Westen wrote that "the right to a speedy trial, like that based 
on the prohibition against double jeopardy, is one of those defenses that is deemed to survive a 
guilty plea." Westen, supra note 5, at 1224. But he offered little explanation why, under the 
Court's rationale, speedy-trial claims must survive a guilty plea. His accompanying footnote 
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rights that expire, Professor Westen proposes the following rule: 
[A] defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may chal-
lenge his conviction on any constitutional ground that, if asserted 
before trial, would forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid 
conviction against him, regardless of how much the state might en-
deavor to correct the defect. In other words, a plea of guilty may oper-
ate as a forfeiture of all defenses except those that, once raised, cannot 
be "cured."79 
I conclude that with two amendments the proposed rule explains 
the Supreme Court's decisions and defensibly distinguishes rights 
that are lost and those that are retained following a plea of guilty. 
But in my view, the correct rationale for the amended rule is far 
removed from that offered by Professor Westen for his rule. The 
rationale offered here comports with established waiver doctrine and 
avoids the need to justify a "forfeiture" doctrine whose dimensions 
are most troublesome.80 Before stating the necessary amendments, 
however, I shall investigate Professor Westen's explanation for his 
rule. 
Westen asserts that the defendant who pleads guilty leads the 
state to believe that it need not gather additional evidence or further 
prepare its case; that if the plea were later overturned, the delay in 
investigation and preparation would prejudice the state; and that a 
constitutional claim should be heard despite a knowing and intelli-
gent plea only when the state will be in no worse position if the plea 
is overturned than it would have been had no plea been entered. 
This analysis is flawed in principle and inadequate to explain the 
Court's cases. 
Fundamentally wrong is the assumption that "the entry of the 
plea itself may have impaired the state's ability thereafter to prove 
the defendant guilty at trial."81 For several reasons, courts should 
cites lower-court cases. I doubt that the Supreme Court itself would consider the answer clear. 
Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), with United States v. MacDonald, 435 
U.S. 850 (1978). I do believe that Westen's is the correct answer for some speedy trial claims, 
however. See note 105 i,!fra. 
79. Westen, supra note 5, at 1226. It is not clear whether the rule is descriptive or prescrip-
tive. The article begins as if the rule were descriptive, but ends with an argument that appears 
to be more prescriptive. 
80. The term "forfeiture" is not new with Westen. Its roots are clear as early as 1963, when 
Justice Brennan authored the landmark opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which 
has now been eroded by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Commentators picked up 
on the term following the Brady trilogy. See, e.g., Tigar, supra note I, at 11, 17, 20. Professor 
Westen echoes the earlier use of the term, although he does so in the context of defending 
some forfeitures, whereas those who wrote before him used the term pejoratively. I shall 
argue that the term is unnecessary to an understanding of the Court's decisions and, more 
importantly, that it has no place in a proper analysis of intelligent guilty pleas. 
81. Westen, supra note 5, at 1236. 
1282 Michigan Law R.eview [Vol. 76:1265 
resist that assumption and any rule that depends upon it. 
First, it is doubtful that the assumption accurately reflects the 
real world of plea bargaining, at least in many jurisdictions. By no 
means is it plain that most plea bargaining occurs before the govern-
ment completes or almost completes its investigation. If the govern-
ment has exhausted all reasonable leads before bargaining, 82 how 
has it lost any valuable opportunities to gather evidence? Even if 
data conclusively showed that prosecutors and police gather less evi-
dence for cases in which bargains are consummated, the Supreme 
Court should not promote such bargaining, but should establish 
rules that encourage complete investigations and knowledgeable 
bargaining in the light of available evidence. 
Second, even if the Court is disinclined to promote fact-gathering 
generally, in many cases a successful attack on a plea, though made 
several days or weeks after the plea, will not disadvantage the gov-
ernment. If a grand jury has investigated a big case, or if a crime is 
already stale when charges are first brought, modest delays between 
a plea's entry and a subsequent challenge probably will not irreme-
diably damage the government's interests. Although in some cases 
memories fade and witnesses die and move, often no such problems 
arise. The Supreme Court has established that the government need 
not indict a criminal defendant at the earliest possible time even 
though delay may reduce the defendant's chances of prevailing.83 
Why, then, should the government be absolutely protected against 
the vicissitudes of delay?84 Indeed, the suggestion that it should be 
presumes that a guilty plea cannot be attacked if the government's 
case at trial would be only one percent ( or perhaps one tenth of one 
percent) weaker because of the plea. Why this balance in the gov-
ernment's favor should prevail is nowhere made clear. The absolute 
rule seems odd when the government, without necessarily violating a 
defendant's rights,85 can delay a trial and prejudice his defense to 
induce him to plead guilty. Rules that require reversal when a party 
in a criminal case suffers any harm whatsoever are disfavored to-
82. Professor Alschuler found that prosecutors have a good sense of their cases' strengths 
and weaknesses before bargaining. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 56-61 (1968). Moreover, the American Bar Association has concluded 
that criminal defendants "should not be hurried through the plea of guilty process." ABA 
Project on Minimum Standards for Crim. Just., Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Com-
mentary to § l.3(b) (App. Draft, 1968). 
83. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
84. Apparently, any disadvantage to the state outweighs a defendant's constitutional claim. 
See Westen, supra note 5, at 1237 n.48, 1249 n.69. 
85. See the four-pronged test for speedy-trial claims in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 
(1972). 
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day.86 Before adopting such rules to bar tb,e litigation of constitu-
tional claims, one should examine their costs and benefits with more 
sophistication. 
Third, and most importantly, the assumption must fall before a 
more powerful argument: If the Supreme Court held that a host of 
constitutibnal challenges could follow a guilty plea, aJ;J.d that a state 
that failed to investigate and prepare adequately, . even after ac-
cepting the plea, would not be heard to complain, a state could 
hardly claim that it .had relied to its detriment if ~ plea were subse-
quently attacked and overturned. If one has to choose between im-
posing burdens on criminal defendants or on the government, one 
might accept the argument that the government must bear the bur-
den because it must shoulder the load in criminal prosecutions. But, 
whether or not this argument is accepted, the indisputable point is 
that an overturned guilty plea disadvantages the state in the manner 
Westen describes only if the Supreme Court creates a system that 
leads the state to think that it need not prove cases once pleas are 
accepted. If the Court announced a "no reliance" approach to some 
or all pleas, the government would be on notice that pleas do not 
necessarily remove all incentives to gather evidence. Because 
Blackledge and Menna hold that some pleas will be overturned after 
they are accepted, the reliance interest of the state already is weak-
ened. 
Even if all guilty pleas so horribly disadvantage the government 
that one is willing to assume that the only constitutional claims that 
justify attacking guilty pleas are those claims that absolutely pre-
clude conviction because of defects the state cannot correct, the prac-
tical problem of·identifying those exceptional cases remains. Be-
cause none of the claims raised in the Brady cases survived, the 
assumption of the preceding sentence requires one to accept Wes-
ten's argument that "none of the defects in the Brady trilogy neces-
sarily precluded the prosecution from ever obtaining a valid 
conviction at trial."87 Although this argument might itself be ques-
86. A rare exception is Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487 (1978). The trend is to 
weigh the costs unfairly imposed by one party on another against the costs of further litigation. 
See generally Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 998-1018 (1973). 
87. Westen, supra note 5, at 1226 n.29, where he explains, 
The defect in Brady could have been cured by redrafting the statute to permit both the 
judge and the jury to impose the death penalty, or by construing the statute to prohibit 
both the judge and the jury from imposing the death penalty. The defect in McMann 
could have been cured by requiring the trial judge to review the validity of the confession 
before allowing it to be considered by the trial jury. The first defect in Parker was identi-
cal to the defect in Brady, the second defect, relating to the admissibility of the defen-
dant's confession, could have been cured by excluding the confession from trial. 
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tioned, 88 it can be accepted arguendo for the sole purpose of showing 
that it fails to distinguish the Brady cases from those allowing consti-
tutional challenges following a plea of guilty. 
Consider, for example, Blackledge. Westen argues that no rem-
edy existed for the prosecutorial error in that case. But surely this is 
incorrect. Under North Carolina law, the prosecutor could have 
brought several different charges against Perry.89 Had the prosecu-
tor known that one of these charges would invite a due process chal-
lenge, he could have brought others.90 Thus, his mistake could have 
been cured. In Menna also the mistake could have been cured by the 
same sort of change which, Westen suggests, could have alleviated 
the constitutional problem with the statute under which Brady was 
convicted. That is, the New York courts could have emphasized that 
the government wanted the contempt citation Menna received 
purged and that his thirty-day sentence, properly construed, was not 
a criminal, but a civil, contempt sentence with a maximum term.91 It 
88. It is not clear that the kidnapping statute could be redrafted after Brady's crime to 
apply to him. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). Moreover, it is doubtful that a 
court could remove through statutory construction a penalty expressly included. The proce-
dural problems in McMann relating to confessions might have been cured, but by whom? 
Would a trial judge have had the power to change established state procedure? The Court of 
Appeals of New York, whose judges are bound to follow the United States Constitution, re• 
fused to grant relief in the case that eventually became Jackson v. Denno, presumably signify-
ing that it did not believe a change was required by the Constitution and was not persuaded 
that state law needed a non-constitutional revision. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 
N.E.2d 59,219 N.Y.S.2d 621, cert. denied sub nom. Jackson v. New York, 368 U.S. 949 (1961). 
In fact, the Supreme Court had sustained the constitutionality of the New York procedure in 
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). The state legislature might have changed the proce-
dure (but cf. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977) (limiting power of legislature to 
bifurcate issues at trial), discussed in Gallivan, Insanity, B!furcation and Due Process: Can 
Values Survive Doctrine, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 515 (1978)), assuming that it was in 
session, that it could act before speedy trial rights would have been denied, that it believed a 
change necessary or desirable, and that it would have taken an action arguably casting doubt 
upon the legitimacy of prior practice. Viewed in this light, the argument that a change could 
have been made is suspect. Undoubtedly, a state able to read future Supreme Courts' minds 
could rewrite statutes and redesign procedures to avoid constitutional problems. But the same 
state could restructure its laws and improve its prosecutorial techniques to avoid many double 
jeopardy and related claims. Finally, it is not clear that a case like Parker could be tried if the 
confession and all facts were suppressed. 
89. For example, the prosecutor might have brought a new charge of carrying a concealed 
weapon. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269 (Supp. 1977). A conviction might have resulted in a 
consecutive sentence that would have increased Perry's overall prison time. 
90. I assume that even though the Supreme Court did not reach Perry's double jeopardy 
claim, its due process holding implicitly accepted Perry's argument that the original misde-
meanor charge was a lesser-included offense of the more severe felony charge. I think this is a 
fair assumption in light of the majority opinions in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 
{1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 {1970). But 
see United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 
571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). The Brief for Respondent, at 6-7, 18-19, 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), also supports my assumption. 
91. One can suffer a criminal contempt penalty even after serving time for civil contempt. 
See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Moreover, the govern-
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would thereby have cured the due process-double jeopardy problem. 
The government might often remedy speedy trial claims, which 
Westen's approach considers equivalent to Pearce-Blackledge due 
process and Menna double jeopardy claims, by honing charges, 
changing the indictment or information to avoid prejudice attribut-
able to delay, and perhaps even by stipulating as true certain facts· 
raised by a defendant or by withdrawing prosecutorial evidence of-
fered to rebut defense evidence that has been weakened by delay. 
Such remedies would involve balancing of the kind done when 
judges consider speedy-trial claims and conclude that the govern-
ment may prosecute despite delay.92 Even if the government cannot 
refine or substitute charges, it might be able to reopen its investiga-
tion in an effort to make a new case on a permissible charge. 
Finally, in the case in which there is nothing, absolutely nothing, 
that the government could do to punish a person like Perry or 
Menna, the fact remains that there is damage to the government as a 
result of delay in raising the constitutional claim. Precious judicial 
resources-along with some prosecutorial, probation and perhaps 
defender resources-would have been exhausted in connection with 
taking the plea and sentencing an offender. These should not be 
overlooked. 
Thus, Westen's rationale is without support. I do not suggest, 
however, that we should disregard the state's interests that I have 
identified above. In the next Part, where a new rationale is offered to 
explain the guilty plea cases, I discuss a new way of protecting those 
interests. 
III. AN AMENDED RULE: A NEW RATIONALE 
A. The Amended Rule and New Rationale 
If amended to read as follows, Professor Westen's rule would ex-
plain the Supreme Court's decisions and could be justified: 
A defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty and who 
ment might have called Menna before the grand jury again, and ifhe refused to testify it could 
have sought another contempt citation and jail term. On the remand to the state courts in 
Menna, see note 99 i'!fra, New York could have made the argument that I suggest in the text. 
But, as a practical matter, it might have been too late to recall Menna before the grand jury. 
92. I do not argue here that a speedy-trial violation does not mandate a dismissal, see 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973), although a strong case can be made that dismissal 
should not be the only sanction for all speedy trial violations. See Amsterdam, Speedy Crimi-
nal Trial· Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REv. 525 (1975). I only need claim here that the 
government, when facing a speedy-trial claim, can seek to avoid dismissal on the ground that it 
violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments by urging that a less drastic remedy be em-
ployed. 
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has complied with pre-plea procedural rules regarding notice of constitu-
tional claims may challenge his conviction on any constitutional 
ground that, if asserted before trial, would forever preclude the state 
from obtaining a valid conviction against him on the charge to which he 
pleaded, regardless of how much the state might endeavor to correct 
the defect. 
The theory I off er is: Certain constitutional rights, like double 
jeopardy and its due process cousin (born in North Carolina v. 
Pearce and recognized in Blackledge), are largely premised on the 
idea that one should not have to bear the financial, emotional, and 
other costs of more than one prosecution for the same offense.93 Be-
cause those constitutional rights are premised on cost avoid-
ance-that is, on avoiding any trial on the merits-persons claiming 
such rights should not be compelled, if they have a valid claim, to 
bear the burdens of the litigation against which the double jeopardy 
and due process clauses protect them. Rather, if they choose, they 
should be able to raise their claims in the least expensive way. Thus, 
a state may desire finality in adjudication, and it may use guilty 
pleas to promote finality and reduce considerably the cost of litiga-
tion, but it may not use the guilty plea to undercut constitutional 
protections whose purpose is to relieve criminal defendants of litiga-
tion. In other words, •if, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the 
sustaining of a constitutional claim would bar any litigation of the 
specific charges against a defendant, the defendant has a right to 
plead guilty and retain the claim. This rationale emphasizes the pro-
tection afforded defendants by the Constitution, not the disadvan-
tages to the state when pleas are overturned. But I am also 
concerned with the state's legitimate interests and, shortly, I shall 
suggest a pleading mechanism to protect them. 
We can see, therefore, why Menna could plead guilty to the 
charge which placed him in jeopardy a second time and still raise his 
double jeopardy claim.94 The government could not force Menna to 
spend money to defend himself at a full trial as a condition of raising 
93. In Pearce and Blackledge, the Court was willing to equate a trial de novo on the same 
charge with an appeal in the same prosecution, but was concerned that after a change in the 
nat,ure of the charge, the trial de novo appeared to be the equivalent of a second prosecution 
with attendant, additional costs to the defendant. 
94. This is not to say that New York could not prohibit pleas of guilty and require trials for 
everyone. q. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (holding that plea bargaining is not 
a constitutional right). See also note 2 supra. It is only to say that when a state provides 
alternative methods for disposing of criminal cases, the defendant can seek the least costly 
, method for vindicating a double jeopardy claim. If guilty pleas are barred, however, one 
might argue from the analysis offered here that a constitutional right does exist to pre-trial 
consideration of a double jeopardy claim. q. State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 384 A.2d 326 
(1977) (speedy-trial claims receive special treatment). 
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his double jeopardy claim.95 He was allowed, because of the nature 
of the constitutional claim, to take the speedy and less expensive 
route of pleading guilty96 and then asserting his claim.97 New York 
may not have desired this procedure, but the constitutional protec-
tion upon which Menna relied, according to the Supreme Court, lim-
ited New York's capacity to bar the post-plea claim of double 
jeopardy. 
Blackledge can be similarly explained. As noted above, Perry's 
due process claim resembled a double jeopardy claim.98 In seeking 
collateral review of his conviction, one can argue, Perry avoided at 
the lowest possible cost the improper charge added before the de 
novo trial. 
The Supreme Court recognized, but lightly passed over,. one dif-
ference between the two cases. The second charge against Menna 
was improper; thus, the government could impose no penalty once 
the court sustained the double jeopardy claim. Accordingly, if that 
claim :finally prevailed on the merits in light of New York law, the 
conviction would have to be vacated.99 In Blackledge, the state 
could have proceeded in the higher court; what it could not properly 
do was raise the grade of the offense in the higher court. 100 There is 
some merit, then, in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting argument that the 
case should have been remanded for resentencing in accordance with 
Pearce.101 But Justice Rehnquist's argument omits one fact which 
95. It is extremely unlikely that the government will reimburse the successful criminal de-
fendant. q. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (recognizing legitimate state interests in 
statutes requiring indigent defendants to reimburse state expense in providing counsel, though 
striking down the statute in question on equal protection grounds); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 
357 (1971) (acquitted defendant can be assessed a portion of bail amount as administrative 
costs). Even if states co=only reimbursed acquitted defendants for out-of-pocket expenses, 
it would be a rare jurisdiction that attempted to compensate for the emotional trauma of a 
trial. See also note 11 supra. 
96. Obviously, the defendant who pleads guilty under these circumstances is stuck with the 
conviction if his post-plea claim fails. But he is aware of that when pleading and deliberately 
chooses not to contest his guilt on the merits. 
97. It is generally assumed that pleas are often entered to avoid the costs of litigation. 
There is reason to think that, at least as respects the state, that assumption is valid. See Y. 
KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1096 n.d (4th ed. 1974). 
Defendants who plead guilty may be concerned with different "costs" including the physical 
and mental costs of trials. But, because they plead guilty they must believe that they have 
gotten a benefit ( cost reduction) as a result. 
98. See note 66 supra. 
99. In Menna, the Supreme Court remanded for a decision on the merits, sini:e the New 
York Court of Appeals, relying on Tollett's decision regarding post-plea challenges, had not 
reached the underlying constitutional claim. 
100. The state can raise the grade of the offense only in exceptional circumstances. See 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974) (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 
(1912)). 
101. 417 U.S. at 37-39. 
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reveals that the majority acted properly and consistently with the 
theory outlined here in vacating Perry's conviction. When the prose-
cution moved from a lesser to a greater offense, it alleged a new ele-
ment of the crime-that Perry acted "with intent to kill and inflict 
serious bodily injury." Surely a defendant would not be indifferent 
about which offense, the greater or lesser, would produce a convic-
tion. The seriousness of the offense for which he was convicted 
might increase the stigma and might also affect any future involve-
ment with the police, the prosecutor, or the court. Faced with the 
greater charge, Perry had a choice: go to trial or plead guilty. Under 
the majority's approach as explicated here, Perry could not be asked 
to assume the risks involved in litigating the greater claim. Hence, 
the majority justifiably vacated the conviction and freed the prosecu-
tion to restore the original misdemeanor charge to the docket of the 
court of record. 
With Menna and Blackledge accounted for, only Tollett and the 
Brady trilogy remain. None of the constitutional claims raised in 
those cases invoked rights that are firmly rooted in a concern that 
litigation costs not be imposed on criminal defendants. Arguably, all 
constitutional claims are equal and therefore all should be litigable 
at the lowest cost. This position is tenable, 102 but the Supreme Court 
seems never to have adopted it or anything very close to it. 103 In 
fact, the Brady trilogy's principle, if not its language, conflicts with 
that argument. Even those who like the argument, however, can 
concede that particular rights exist whose purpose in substantial part 
is to avoid litigation by accused persons. 
The constitutional claims raised in the Brady trilogy concerned 
two confessions and the effect on guilty pleas of two statutory pen-
alty schemes, one of which was invalid and the other of which the 
Court suggested might also be unconstitutional. The right to jury 
trial, which the federal statute before the Court certainly impinged, 
is not a right established to avoid trials. And if the state statute in-
volved in Parker were invalid as discouraging litigation, a challenge 
to it would not be based on a litigation-avoidance rationale. Nor is 
the right to suppress coerced confessions designed to avoid litigation. 
Of course, the government may have insufficient evidence to proceed 
102. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (no mention permitted at trial of the 
defendant's silence after )learing Miranda warnings); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 
(1968) (no use by prosecution in case-in-chief of defendant's testimony during suppression 
hearing); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (no co=ent permitted on a defendant's 
decision not to .testify). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). See also Corbitt v. New 
Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978). 
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if a confession is suppressed, but that is not necessarily so. More-
over, an improperly obtained confession is not suppressed to protect 
a defendant against a trial on the merits. Similarly, the challenge in 
Tollett to the composition of a state grand jury did not rest signifi-
cantly on a defendant's interest in conserving resources. 104 If the 
challenge were sustained, the state could nonetheless renew litigation 
if it could obtain a proper indictment. Where the state already has 
secured a conviction, the indictment surely would be forthcoming. 
Hence, the theory presented here reconciles all of the cases decided 
recently. 
B. The Rationale Applied in a .D!fferent Context 105 
This new rationale also helps to explain the willingness of two 
104. The right to be indicted by a fairly chosen grand jury arguably embodies a concern 
that defendants not stand trial unnecessarily. But Tollett was a state case, and states need not 
use grand juries. See Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928); Hurtado v. California, 110 
U.S. 516 (1884). Attacks on improperly chosen state grand juries proceed under the equal 
protection clause. See generally Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 
396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Commn., 396 U.S. 320 (1970). Even in federal jurisdic-
tions, however, where the fifth amendment's grand jury requirement applies of its own force, 
there is reason to think that the requirement embodies a greater concern for the appearance of 
fairness than for the protection against litigation expenses. It becomes difficult to believe after 
a conviction by plea or trial that, but for improprieties in the selection process, the grand jury 
would not have returned an indictment. More important, once a conviction is obtained, a 
second grand jury almost certainly would indict. Thus, under my test, the state not only could, 
but would, prosecute on the same charge again. Therefore, a plea results in the loss of an 
opportunity to attack the composition of the grand jury. It may be that even those defendants 
who go to trial should suffer a similar loss upon conviction. Professor Alschuler suggests that 
Supreme Court decisions permitting challenges to a grand jury's composition after conviction 
by a properly selected trial jury are difficult to explain "in terms of insuring fair procedure for 
the defendants themselves." Alschuler, supra note 5, at 29. He explains the decisions as "the 
only effective means of correcting an unconstitutional practice that would otherwise persist." 
Id. at 30. But other remedies do exist. For example, challenges to grand jury procedures can 
be raised in civil suits. See, e.g., Castaneda, Turner, and Carter. If the Gourt wants to protect 
the defendant's right to an impartial grand jury, it could fashion a remedy that would not 
require unnecessary retrials: upon a finding that an indicting grand jury was improperly se-
lected, a case would be sent to a new, properly constituted grand jury, which would not be told 
of the successful prosecution and which would redetermine whether an indictment should is-
sue. Any objection that the later grand jury might be considerably different from the improp-
erly selected one would fall in light of the fact that existing law allows a subsequent grand jury 
to reindict and a second trial to be held. 
105. Earlier, I referred to speedy-trial claims. See note 78 supra. Such claims probably 
express a cost-minimization, trial-avoidance concern of a special kind. The disadvantages to a 
defendant of a delayed trial are such that at some point, the defendant wins the right not to be 
tried at all. See, e.g., State v. Tiedemann, -- Mont. --, 584 P.2d 1284 (1978). Thus, a 
criminal defendant who pleads guilty can probably raise a speedy-trial claim to attack his 
conviction. Because the merits of such a claim more readily appear after trial, see United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978), the entry of a plea may reduce the chance that a 
subsequent attack will succeed. 
I have also mentioned subject matter jurisdiction and fundamental fairness claims. See 
note 62 supra. Courts would probably consider counsel's failure to complain of an absence of 
jurisdiction or of the state's failure to provide fair procedures among the best examples of 
ineffective assistance. The more outrageous it seems to deny someone the right to raise a 
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Justices in Ellis v . .Dyson 106 to hold that two defendants who pleaded 
guilty107 to violating a city loitering ordinance thereby lost the right 
to sue for expunction of their arrest records on the ground that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In light of their reservations about 
abstention and the case-or-controversy requirement, the majority 
concluded "that it would be inappropriate . . . to touch upon any of 
the other complex and difficult issues that the case otherwise might 
present,"108 which included the significance, if any, of the fact that 
the plaintiffs had pleaded guilty. However, Justices Powell and 
Stewart109 argued that the complaint was properly dismissed because 
the two plaintiffs had pleaded guilty: 
When a state criminal defendant pleads guilty to state charges or re-
fuses to invoke state appellate remedies, his conviction no longer can 
be said to rest on an alleged denial of a constitutional right. Instead, it 
rests solely on the defendant's refusal to litigate the asserted right. The 
only issue then cognizable on collateral attack is whether the refusal to 
litigate was knowing and voluntary. If it was, collateral attack based 
on the asserted constitutional claim is foreclosed. 110 
The two dissenters' language perpetuates the confusion generated by 
Blackledge, which is discussed above, 111 and the dissenters surpris-
ingly fail to cite several precedents that would have suggested a dif-
ferent conclusion. 112 
Yet, the dissenting opinion comports with the theory offered here 
to reconcile the Supreme Court's guilty plea opinions.113 To chal-
lenge the Dallas loitering ordinance, the plaintiffs invoked the 
special first amendment claim that, whether or not their conduct was 
punishable under a properly drawn statute, the vagueness and over-
breadth of the ordinance required that the guilty pleas be set 
aside. 114 The vagueness claim is more easily disposed of than the 
overbreadth challenge. When a defendant claims that a statute is too 
vague, the defendant raises problems of notice and potential arbi-
claim, the more likely it is that the raising of that claim will be presumed a requirement of 
adequate legal assistance. 
106. 421 U.S. 426, 437 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Powell and Stewart, JJ.). 
107. Actually, the defendants pleaded nolo contendere, but with respect to punishment 
that plea has the same effect as a guilty plea. 421 U.S. at 428 n.3. 
108. 421 U.S. at 435. 
109. The Chief Justice joined another part of the dissenting opinion. 
110. 421 U.S. at 442. 
111. See text at notes 59-75 supra. 
112. That failure is pointed out in Alschuler, supra note 5, at 17-21, and Westen, supra 
note 5, at 1225-26 n.28. 
113. Another justification for the dissenting opinion is set forth in the text at notes 119-21 
i'!fra. A third theory might have been res judicata. But see note 161 1iifra. 
114. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 710-24 (1978). 
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trariness in law enforcement. Neither is a litigation-avoidance prob-
lem; neither involves a threat to protected activity. Overbreadth is 
more troublesome because the claim is that the statute impinges 
upon protected activities. But one may conclude that litigants who 
plead guilty effectively concede that their conduct is not beyond the 
punitive reach of the state and that the challenged ordinance would 
be properly construed to reach their conduct. Although the ordi-
nance still may impermissibly threaten the protected activities of 
others, the Ellis dissenters said that one defendant's rare opportunity 
to raise another's claims would be denied those who plead guilty. 
Arguably, this produces a sound result since those defendants who 
enter guilty pleas may "chill" the speech of others by suggesting that 
the statutes to which they plead are valid. It makes some sense then 
to restrict the overbreadth aspect of jus tertii to those willing to fight 
at trial. But, it might be argued in response that guilty pleas would 
not "chill" the speech of third persons if the pleading defendants 
could make post-plea overbreadth claims. I would reject this argu-
ment on the ground that the pleaders might be punished immedi-
ately after pleading and that some "chill" might occur. I cannot 
deny, however, that the "chill" might be reduced if post-plea chal-
lenges were permitted. But the fact remains that it is reasonable for 
the dissenters to want to restrict overbreadth challenges in order to 
promote prompt pre-plea challenges to invalid statutes. 
If litigants claimed that the state's coercive power did not reach 
certain conduct, that claim should be considered even after a plea. 
In fact, the dissenting opinion in Ellis suggests at a slightly different 
point that persons who claim that legislative enactments impinge on 
their constitutionally protected activity should have greater access to 
collateral attack than those whose complaint is that the statute 
sweeps overbroadly and therefore threatens others. 115 
In essence, this Article's theory recognizes that one's right to en-
gage in constitutionally protected activity-conduct that cannot be 
criminally sanctioned-embraces the opportunity to prevent the gov-
ernment from imposing the costs of litigation on the protected con-
duct. If criminal defendants could not plead guilty, avoid trial, and 
raise collateral claims, the imposition of litigation costs might be an 
additional government weapon against protected activity. This 
would explain why the defendant in Haynes v. United States, 116 who 
115. 421 U.S. at 447. The dissenters discussed cases in which the Court "found constitu-
tional challenges to state and federal statutes justiciable despite the absence of actual threats of 
enforcement directed personally to the plaintiff." 421 U.S. at 447. 
116. 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
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pleaded guilty to a federal firearms statute violation, could raise a 
constitutional claim after pleading. Because of the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the existence of federal criminal firearms stat-
utes, no law requiring a person to supply information concerning 
firearms to the government was likely to pass muster. Hence, the 
defendant's failure to register his firearm was beyond the reach of 
legitimate penalty provisions, and the defendant could raise that 
claim following a plea of guilty. 117 The theory also explains lan-
guage from other cases that some commentators have used in criti-
cizing the Ellis dissenters. 118 
Nothing in the theory is inconsistent with another reading of the 
Ellis dissent. The dissenters may have been concerned that, because 
the Ellis plaintiffs had actually raised their constitutional claim by 
pre-trial motion before pleading guilty, their pleas might have re-
sulted from a bargain in which the plaintiffs received concessions 
from the state in exchange for abandoning all their defenses, includ-
ing the constitutional attack on the statute. If this did concern the 
dissenters, they probably should have voted for a remand to ascer-
tain whether any bargaining had taken place or any deal had been 
made, and if so, the precise contours. 119 But even if the dissenters 
too quickly made assumptions unfavorable to the plaintiffs, their 
opinion foreshadows arguments that one would expect to see in fu-
ture cases. If a defendant bargained with the government knowingly 
and intelligently (presumably advised by competent counsel) and ex-
. plicitly offered to forego a constitutional claim in exchange for a 
117. The Court relied upon the Haynes decision, inter alia, in Leary v. United States, 396 
U.S. 6 (1969). What Professor Alschuler said about Leary he also might have said about 
Haynes: "The Court's view was plainly that the line of self-incrimination cases that included 
Leary had 'dealt with the kind of conduct that cannot constitutionally be punished in the first 
instance.'" Alschuler, supra note 5, at 20 n.65 (quoting from United States v. United Stales 
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 723 (1971)). Although the Court reached a different result on 
the merits of the underlying fifth amendment claim, the justification for reaching the merits of 
the underlying claim in Haynes also justified reaching the merits in Sullivan v. United States, 
348 U.S. 170 (1954). 
I 18. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), relied upon by Alschuler, supra note 
5, at 18-19. Aside from the fact that the case did not present the question of what rights were 
lost by a plea, the fact that Siebold involved the reach of federal power signifies that it fits the 
analysis suggested here. See also Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921), also cited by Al-
schuler, supra note 5, at 19 n.61. Boender involved in part a challenge to the reach of congres-
sional power to punish private acts. The remaining part dealt with a claim that certain 
conduct was constitutionally protected unless accompanied by proof of certain types of mens 
rea. Both claims asserted that Congress could not punish the petitioner's conduct-i.e., the 
conduct was beyond the federal government's reach. The petitioner was unsuccessful there. 
Some habeas petitioners have fared better. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
I 19. As the majority opinion indicates, the court that accepted the pleas had rejected the 
constitutional claim before the pleas were entered. 421 U.S. at 428. No mention of any bar-
gain is made. 
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benefit, the Supreme Court should enforce the bargain, 120 except in 
unusual circumstances where a claim cannot be waived. 121 
If a defendant raises a double jeopardy claim as in Menna, or a 
related due process claim as in Blackledge, the prosecution may dis-
cuss with him the filing of charges that circumvent the double jeop-
ardy problem. If the defendant prefers the existing charges to the 
prospective charges and agrees to forego the double jeopardy de-
fense in exchange for the benefit of not facing the new charges, a 
court could reasonably respect the bargain, since the government 
gave up a legitimate opportunity to prosecute in order to please the 
defendant. If the government cannot readily circumvent the double 
jeopardy or due process claim, but the validity of that claim is uncer-
tain, there is still room for bargaining. If the defendant agrees ex-
plicitly to give up a claim in return for government concessions, that 
decision can be respected in the same way that a defendant's deci-
sion not to challenge a confession essential to the government's case 
is respected. Bargains are ma~e because, in a world of uncertainty, 
both parties prefer a negotiated agreement to a winner-take-all solu-
tion.122 •The defendant says in effect, "I have a right to plead guilty 
and then raise a double jeopardy claim, but I will relinquish that 
right for a better plea." If the prosecutor accepts the offer, there is no 
reason why the defendant should be able to seek to set aside the plea 
and, should the attack fail, still get the benefit of the bargain. Even 
if the defendant must forego the bargain to challenge the plea, the 
prosecutor's interest in finality and in avoiding post-plea challenges 
remains. If plea bargaining is permissible, an explicit bargain should 
be respected. If the government cannot circumvent the defendant's 
constitutional claim and there is no reasonable doubt that the claim 
is correct, an intelligent, knowing defendant, represented by compe-
tent counsel, would never plead guilty. When doubts about the 
claim exist, they should be treated no differently from doubts about 
guilt and innocence-i.e., they are subject to bargaining. 
It is possible to identify a class of cases in which even a negoti-
ated plea should not bar a later attack on a conviction: that is, where 
the state alleges conduct which was not clearly beyond the reach of 
its criminal sanction at the time the defendant pleaded guilty but 
subsequently is held to be. In that case, the government cannot pun-
120. See United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 
(1965). 
121. See note 62 supra. 
122. See generally Ballou, "Jurisdictional" Indictments, Ieformations and Complaints: An 
Unnecessary .Doctrine, 29 ME. L. R.E.v. l (1977). 
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ish the conduct under any circumstances. If the Constitution un-
questionably protects the conduct so that no law could reach it, the 
state has no valid interest in enforcing its bargain. Professor Westen, 
who disagrees, argues that "the fact that a statute is declared uncon-
stitutional does not mean the state has 'no interest' in enforcing the 
statute; it merely means that the state's interests are overridden by 
the defendant's constitutional interests." 123 This misses the point, 
however. If the conduct is constitutionally protected, enforcing an 
earlier plea bargain advances no state interest properly cognizable in 
courts pledged to support the Constitution. But Professor Westen 
fears that this principle, if accepted, must extend "to every constitu-
tional defense to conviction, including the grand jury defense in 
Tol/ett." 124 His argument assumes the conclusion; it fails to explain 
why a Court cannot distinguish two classes of cases-those involving 
conduct the state is entitled to punish and those involving conduct 
the state is forbidden to punish. In the former, the issue is whether 
defendants who are fully advised of their rights, and who wish to 
plead guilty after bargaining in an area of uncertainty, should be 
able to minimize the uncertainty through a guilty plea and then, hav-
ing captured the advantages of the bargain, be able to attack the 
conviction. A guilty plea procedure is an alternative system for vin-
dicating the state's power to control conduct properly within its 
reach. In the latter class of cases, no procedures can change the fact 
that the state cannot have a constitutionally cognizable purpose in 
punishing some conduct. 
The problem with any argument in favor of allowing those who 
negotiate a plea to take advantage of a change in the law is that it 
ignores the state's legitimate interest in avoiding expensive litigation. 
If only' a trip through appellate litigation, perhaps in both state and 
federal courts, can answer the question whether the actual conduct 
of the defendant who pleaded is constitutionally protected under a 
newly established constitutional doctrine, the state may powerfully 
argue that a plea bargain should bar a subsequent attack claiming 
constitutional protection for the defendant's conduct. This problem 
may well be insurmountable.125 
123. Westen, supra note 5, at 1230 n.35. 
124. Id. at 1231 n.36. 
125. It is true, of course, that Blackledge, Menna and all post-plea claims involve potential 
fact-finding burdens, but the Court has forced the state to bear, or at least share, these burdens 
in order to vindicate the right of defendants to avoid costly trials. If a defendant expressly 
gives up such a right, courts are less likely to want to burden the state. 
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C. Procedural Requirements To Protect the State 
It also should be evident that nothing in the theory espoused here 
prohibits procedural rules that require a criminal defendant who 
wishes to preserve a claim of the sort that existing Supreme Court 
opinions indicate will survive a guilty plea to raise that claim when 
his plea is entered or before. 126 Ever more commonly, courts adopt 
procedural rules that require defendants to raise claims before 
trial. 127 A defendant who ignores such rules loses the claim on direct 
review and, in light of the Supreme Court's recent change in attitude, 
also may be unable to resurrect the claim by collateral attack. 128 
It seems clear to some courts that a defendant who goes to trial 
without raising a double jeopardy claim loses it. To do otherwise, 
one court has reasoned, "would allow the defendant a free shot at an 
acquittal at the second trial but, failing that, a certain reversal of the 
conviction in a later collateral proceeding."129 This rationale rests 
on an unfounded assumption. 130 In many instances, a defendant 
who goes to trial hardly receives a free shot at acquittal. If the de-
fendant pays •for his counsel, the costs associated with a trial are 
likely to be greater than the costs of raising a double jeopardy claim 
by motion before trial. If the defendant cannot secure release pend-
ing his trial, the various discomforts of jail and the loss of wages and 
opportunities combine to make the choice to undertake a trial rather 
than to file a pre-trial motion more onerous than simply "a free 
shot." Also, the defendant who proceeds to trial risks a sentence that 
may be considerably higher than the one attaching to a guilty 
plea. 131 Unless the defendant knows with certainty that any convic-
126. The Supreme Court lightly passed over the state's argument in Tollett that the defen-
dant did not follow its procedural rules and that this alone barred his collateral attack. Since 
the defendant incurs no greater cost by raising a claim before pleading, rather than after, 
requiring him to raise claims promptly does not violate the cost minimization aspects of the 
constitutional right. 
127. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). 
128. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). 
129. Ochoa v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (W.D. Tex. 1976). The district court, citing 
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), held that comity requires deference to a state law 
mandating a pre-trial challenge on double jeopardy grounds. 
130. Perhaps this explains why other courts reject the idea that the claim is-lost if not 
raised before trial. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1975). 
131. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Offenders in the 
United States District Courts, 1965, at 28 (1967), reported in D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 194 n.429 (1968). The constitutionality of a higher 
sentence after trial than after a guilty plea is unclear. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 
264 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977). See also 
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978). See generally ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty 
§ 1.8(a) (Approved Draft 1968). 
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tion will be overturned on appeal, he assumes the risk that an unsuc-
cessful double jeopardy claim will leave a higher sentence in effect. 
Moreover he may begin to serve the sentence while making the col-
lateral attack. This is no small price for going to trial. Thus, costs of 
several different kinds fetter the choice to litigate the merits; the as-
sumption underlying the quoted rationale is therefore vulnerable. 132 
Why, then, may a rule require that certain claims be raised 
promptly before trial or not at all? The answer lies in two state inter-
ests: the interest in conserving resources by avoiding trials that 
would be unnecessary if defendants raised insurmountable bars to 
valid prosecutions, 133 and the interest in correcting remediable er-
rors134 while that is still possible135 and before resources are 
wasted. 136 These interests are protected by rules requiring that, upon 
pain_ of losing them, some claims be raised before litigation com-
mences. 
Similar state interests justify a rule requiring defendants to raise 
constitutional claims that they wish to preserve for post-plea attack 
before their pleas are accepted. Such a rule often would allow the 
prosecutor not only to avoid unnecessary plea bargaining and prepa-
ration for sentence recommendations (if permitted) but also to avoid 
constitutional problems whenever possible. The failure of a defen-
dant advised by competent counsel to raise a claim pursuant to the 
132. In one sense the defendant who pleads may get something "free." If the prosecutor 
bargains unaware of a prospective constitutional challenge, the defendant may gain a good 
bargain without "paying" for the right to make his challenge. This suggests, as do other argu-
ments made in the text at notes 137-38 i,!fra, that, before they plead, defendants should have to 
raise the claims they intend to assert later. But even when the prosecutor is unaware that the 
defendant may raise a post-plea claim, the defendant who pleads does give up rights. 
Prosecutorial ignorance may affect the bargaining process, but the plea still amounts to a loss 
of rights by the defendant. 
133. One might argue that the state needs no such protection because no rational defen-
dant would incur defense costs by failing to make an appropriate pre-trial motion when he 
could plainly bar a successful prosecution. In some cases, however, the burdens of properly 
presenting a pre-trial claim may eclipse the costs of defending at trial. Yet, the costs to the 
government of trying the case, in view of the heavy burden of persuasion it bears, may be 
much greater than any set of costs to the defendant. In such cases the government reasonably 
wants the defendant to reduce the government's costs for a fruitless prosecution. The rule also 
protects against the defendant who, knowing that his claim could bar any prosecution, wants 
to waste government resources in retribution for having to defend himself. 
134. I have previously noted that when double jeopardy or due process problems block 
some prosecutions, other charges may be substituted. The substitution may not be perfect, but 
the prosecutor will prefer a second best charge to one that ultimately cannot stick. In fact, the 
prosecutor may prefer a second best charge devoid of constitutional problems to a better 
charge beset with constitutional difficulties. 
135. E.g., before the statute of limitations on an alternative charge runs. Bui see 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3288-89 (1976). 
136. If a prosecutor were indifferent to which of two charges to bring, and only one of 
them presented constitutional problems, the prosecutor would avoid unnecessary litigation by 
choosing the other. 
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proposed rule would result in the loss of the constitutional claim. 137 
Since the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases now demonstrate that 
pleas of guilty do not a fortiori result in the loss of constitutional 
claims, frugal states should and probably will require that defen-
dants assert constitutional claims which would not be lost after an 
ordinary guilty plea before the pleas are entered if they are to be 
preserved for post-plea attack. 138 I believe that the Court would sus-
tain such a notice rule; but Professor Westen's analysis probably 
would lead to a conclusion that any notice rule is invalid as applied 
to double jeopardy and similar claims, since he views these as be-
yond the state's capacity to repair. It is ironical, therefore, that his 
approach, which is designed to protect the state from injury, fails to 
do so; but the rationale I suggest, which is not dependent on identify-
ing injury to the state when a plea is overturned, since I believe there 
is likely to be damage in all such cases, permits the state to protect its 
legitimate interests without impairing constitutional rights.139 
If notice is required and the requirement is satisfied, does the 
plea nevertheless vitiate the claims raised? The answer must be 
"no." Surely the Supreme Court's cases suggest that, with the excep-
tions discussed in this Article, jurisdictions may compel defendants 
to choose between pleading guilty-thus waiving all claims-and go-
ing to trial-thus retaining the claims, but not that they must opt for 
such an all-or-nothing approach. Even though a jurisdiction plainly 
may require defendants to give up quite a bit to plead guilty, and 
though historically most American jurisdictions have done so, 
thoughtful lawmakers might prefer another approach. Some juris-
137. New York and California, for example, permit defendants to appeal from certain 
adverse pre-plea rulings despite the entry of a guilty plea. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRAc. LAW 
§§ 710.70(2)-(3) (McKinney 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1538.5(m) (West 1970). In Lefkowitz 
v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), the Supreme Court held that constitutional claims which 
state law allows a defendant to raise on appeal after a guilty plea are cognizable also in a 
federal habeas corpus action. The Court has never said that the right to raise post-plea chal-
lenges cannot be conditioned upon a prompt pre-plea motion that raises all the claims the 
prospective pleader hopes to preserve; however, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), 
casts an unnecessary shadow over such a procedure. See note 126 supra. Part III. D i'!fra of 
this Article discusses the concepts of forfeiture and waiver. The loss of constitutional claims 
may appear to involve a forfeiture, as some have used the term. But see text at notes 144-50 
i'!fra. 
138. States might even provide, and require that the parties use, speedy avenues for appel-
late review of pre-trial rulings. q. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeop-
ardy claim reviewable on appeal before trial). Of course, the Supreme Court will probably 
adhere to its reasoning in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), that a habeas corpus 
petitioner will not lose a constitutional claim ifhe can adequately explain his failure to raise it 
(by showing "cause") and can demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted. Discerning what the 
Supreme Court means by "prejudice" is no easy matter, however. See Dix, supra note I, at 
211. 
139. See also text at notes 89-92 supra. 
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dictions, attempting to encourage guilty pleas, expressly provide that 
a defendant may after pleading raise certain claims that were raised 
unsuccessfully before pleading.140 The Supreme Court has held that 
federal constitutional claims which a state allows defendants to raise 
in state court following guilty pleas can also be raised in a federal 
habeas corpus action.141 Some jurisdictions without statutes ex-
pressly providing that constitutional claims may be retained follow-
ing a guilty plea allow prosecutors to contract with individual 
defendants to preserve constitutional claims following a plea. 142 
140. See note 137 supra. Also, because the significance of a plea is determined by local 
law except in the few instances in which the Constitution dictates particular attributes of a 
plea, local law can provide that non-constitutional post-plea claims can be raised. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Myers, 478 Pa. 580, 392 A.2d 685 (1978). 
141. In his dissent in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), Justice White argued 
that waiver was not the concept employed in the Brady trilogy and in Tolle/I. 420 U.S. at 299. 
But he used "waiver" in a very limited sense, and-nothing in his reasoning is inconsistent with 
my argument. Justice White maintained that New York could not give defendants an expecta-
tion that federal courts would hear certain constitutional claims following a guilty plea in state 
court. His argument on this point is unexceptionable. If Congress wanted, it could ban federal 
habeas corpus suits by persons who plead guilty in state courts, except in the extraordinary 
case where the Constitution might require some form of federal review by habeas action even 
for a person who was told before pleading that the plea would deprive him of a federal forum. 
What Justice White missed was that, whether New York properly interpreted federal law or 
not, it almost surely led some criminal defendants to believe that, after pleading guilty, they 
retained all opportunities for vindicating constitutional claims. Had the Supreme Court dis-
senters prevailed, all the pleas entered in New York prior to the decision, and during the 
period when New York permitted defendants to raise specified constitutional claims after 
pleading guilty, arguably would have been invalidated on the ground that the defendants were 
inadequately informed of what they gave up by pleading guilty. In the case of defendants who 
raised pre-plea constitutional claims, it would have been especially difficult for the Supreme 
Court to have said that the loss of a federal forum would not have significantly influenced the 
decision whether or not to plead. In a footnote, 420 U.S. at 301 n.7, Justice White admitted the 
possibility that Newsome and others would have been misled into thinking that they had a 
federal forum, and he suggested that the best course would be to permit repleading for those 
who had pleaded guilty in misplaced reliance before the Supreme Court decision. He did not 
admit that this procedure might have been constitutionally required had his opinion prevailed. 
The other fundamental flaw in the dissent's analysis was its reading of prior cases. In the 
Brady trilogy, in Tollett, and in Blackledge and Menna, the Supreme Court assumed that the 
states wanted maximum finality in the guilty plea process. Thus, those cases addressed the 
federal constitutional limits on state prescriptions as to the finality of a guilty plea. When the 
Court upheld a state's refusal to recognize post-plea challenges, it recognized that the state 
could prescribe maximum finality as a principal goal of a guilty plea system. When the Court 
held that post-plea challenges on some issues had to be recognized, it held that some state 
interests must give way to federal constitutional rights. But in no prior case did the Court 
refuse to promote state interests unless the Constitution required it to refuse. In Lefkowitz, the 
state procedures did not assume that maximum finality was optimal finality. Thus, the 
Supreme Court had to determine the appropriate federal attitude toward relitigation of claims 
made in a state system that purported to treat persons who actually litigated and lost constitu-
tional claims before pleading guilty as if they had gone to trial but presented no defense. Seen 
in this light, the majority's approach to the problem was much superior to the dissenters'. 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); United States v. Callaghan, 
445 F. Supp. 1296 (D.NJ. 1978); McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 {Fla. 1978); State v. 
Aguillard, 357 So. 2d 535 (La. 1978). Some jurisdictions may limit the contracting range. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Florida, 355 So. 2d 138 (Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d 701 
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There is growing acceptance of the idea that an entire trial need not 
be held in order for the defendant to preserve one point of constitu-
tional law. The costs to the defendant and to the state seem exces-
sive. 143 
D. Proceduraf Requirements to Protect the Defendant: Waiver 
Versus Foifeiture 
The government may choose to adopt a notice rule to protect its 
interests, and it may choose to allow defendants to retain, even after 
they plead, all claims properly noticed. It must, in my view, adopt 
procedural safeguards to assure that the defendant understands the 
effect of a guilty plea. A defendant loses no claims by pleading 
guilty unless he waives them, and commentators who argue that 
waiver and forfeiture may be readily distinguished in the guilty plea 
context confuse more than help analysis. 
Waiver has been defined as "a conscious choice made by a per-
son whose right is at issue ( or by someone else with legal authority to 
make the choice for him) that will be given the legal effect ofrender-
ing the advantage of that right unavailable to him."144 Forfeiture 
(Alaska 1978). At least a few federal courts have read the Brady trilogy and Tollett as fore-
closing bargains that preserve claims. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
143. The New York approach has been praised by courts and co=entators. See, e.g., I 
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL§ 175, at 381-82 (1969); United 
States v. Dorsey, 449 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But not all New York courts are 
convinced of its merits. See, e.g., People v. Navarro, 61 App. Div. 2d 534, 403 N.Y.S.2d 80 
(1978). One of the problems with the contract method of preserving claims is that it invites 
prosecutors to suggest contracts that ban judicial supervision of bargains and prosecutorial 
conduct. In Washington v. State, 559 S.W.2d 825 (fex. Crim. App. 1977), for instance, the 
court left open the question whether the defendant could be held to an agreement not to ap-
peal his sentence. The facts of the case are most disturbing. In return for a guilty plea to 
charges of aggravated robbery and attempted murder, the prosecutor agreed to drop capital 
murder charges. After the defendant pleaded and was sentenced, he appealed. Responding to 
what he apparently thought was an agreement not to appeal, the prosecutor reactivated the 
murder case and obtained a death sentence from the jury. The defendant was saved by the 
appellate court decision that the prosecutor mistook the plea bargain and could not properly 
have proceeded with the capital murder charges. Cf. Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 
713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966) (judge cannot offer sentencing concession in return for abandonment of 
appellate rights); Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978) (improper pressure on witness). 
In my view, the courts have accepted plea bargaining largely because they can rule as to what 
is fundamentally fair and what is unconscionable. Most courts that have sanctioned bargain-
ing profess to believe that prosecutors and defendants compromise on areas of uncertainty and 
that their compromise must appear reasonable to a reviewing court. It is not surprising that 
prosecutorial attempts to prevent judges from reviewing bargains appall the courts. If the 
courts truly care to review plea bargains, they might condition their acceptance of a plea upon 
an agreed su=ary by the parties of the nature, scope, and reasons for any plea agreement. 
But their concern does not yet run so deep. . 
144. Dix, supra note 1, at 205. Justice Black used language that has become more familiar: 
"A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
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has been described as the loss of rights "without ever having made a 
deliberate, informed decision to relinquish them, and without having 
ever been in a position to make a cost-free decision to assert them. 
Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs by operation of law without regard 
to-the defendant's state of mind."145 That the difference between the 
concepts can be more apparent than real is best demonstrated by a 
series of hypothetical situations, all of which assume that the defen-
dant is charged with first-degree murder for shooting his wife. 
Situation I. 
The defendant, advised by competent counsel about all aspects of 
the case and all his rights, constitutional and otherwise, pleads guilty 
to second-degree murder. After the key prosecution witness dies of 
heart failure, the defendant attacks his plea, asserting a fact that the 
state stipulates is accurate: Had the defendant chosen to go to trial, 
the trial would have occurred after the witness's death and the gov-
ernment would have had insufficient evidence to go forward. Coun-
sel did not tell the defendant that the witness might die of a heart 
attack, although they did discuss the uncertainty of litigation. Most 
circuits and commentators probably would agree that when the de-
fendant admitted his guilt, 146 he waived the right to challenge the 
conviction on the ground that insufficient evidence existed to convict 
him beyond a reasonable doubt, 147 even though he did not and could 
not know that the key witness would die. 
Situation 2. 
The defendant's lawyer advises him as fully as in Situation 1, 
and, in addition, tells him about the right to jury trial, the advan-
tages and· disadvantages of a jury, and how it is selected. Pursuant to 
a plea bargain, on the trial date the defendant pleads guilty and is 
sentenced. Thereafter, he sees the jury panel that will hear the case 
to be tried in place of his. To his surprise, the defendant finds a 
disproportionately large percentage of his minority group on the jury 
panel. He challenges his plea on the ground that he never would 
have waived his right to a jury trial had he known the panel's com-
position, and that he could not validly relinquish the right to jury 
without that information. Few courts would hesitate even momen-
145. Westen, supra note 5, at 1214. 
146. Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 513 F.2d 72, 78 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant's guilty plea 
not vitiated by government's failure to inform him that its key witness would not have been 
able to testify at trial). 
147. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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tarily to call this a valid waiver. The defendant can waive the right 
to a jury trial if he understands enough about juries generally to de-
cide to forego one. 148 
Situation 3. 
The defendant reveals to his counsel facts sufficient to suggest 
that he killed in self-defense, but after a thorough investigation the 
only evidence of self-defense his counsel can develop is the defen-
dant's own testimony. The defendant considers his prior record and 
its likely use as impeachment evidence should he testify and pleads 
guilty to second-degree murder. Subsequently, witnesses come for-
ward with evidence previously unknown to the prosecution or the 
defense to support the self-defense claim. It is doubtful that the de-
fendant could maintain that because he did not know of the evidence 
and could not therefore have foregone the right to use it in his be-
half, 149 he did not knowingly and intelligently forego his right to 
present a defense. 150 
Traditionally, courts have treated the three hypotheticals as 
waiver problems and have found the waiver doctrine inclusive 
enough to bar post-plea challenges by the three defendants. Use of 
the waiver concept has led courts to inquire into exactly what infor-
mation the defendants had when pleading and exactly what they did 
not know. Thus, the bottom line question for the courts was always 
"did they know enough?" A forfeiture analysis suggests that this is 
the wrong question and that states, by accepting guilty pleas, can 
avoid having it asked and answered. It is this analysis that I find 
unacceptable, since I believe that the basic concept of a guilty plea is 
"almost total waiver."151 The mistake made by those who question 
the waiver analysis is that they confuse waiver with perfect knowl-
edge. The two are not the same. 
Choices are usually made with only imperfect knowledge. One 
of the things that bargaining allows is negotiation about uncertainty. 
To satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement that a guilty plea be 
148. q. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (distinguishing critical elements of an 
offense from other elements). 
149. I do not suggest that states should not permit newly discovered evidence claims on 
behalf of those who plead guilty. Arguably, innocence should matter to a state. See note 70 
supra. But a state is not required to permit such claims to be raised after the Supreme Court's 
decision. 
150. See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), for an example of judicial 
recognition of the right to put on a defense. 
151. See note 155 infra. 
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knowing and intelligent, 152 and shown to be so on the record, 153 the 
defendant must understand how much he loses by a guilty plea. If 
he understands that a plea automatically results in the loss of oppor-
tunities to raise certain claims, the defendant who chooses to plead 
may be said to have made a deliberate, informed waiver. 154 There-
fore, a defendant should be instructed 155 by the trial judge156 as fol-
lows: 
You have indicated that you wish to plead guilty. Our rules provide 
that if you plead guilty you give up the right to challenge on almost all 
grounds the conviction that will result from your plea. Although the 
law provides that in the most limited circumstances a post-plea chal-
lenge can be raised, the cases in which such challenges will be consid-
ered are few. [This jurisdiction has a rule that any claim not raised 
before a plea is entered is lost. You have raised no claims prior to 
pleading and, therefore, no claim possibly could be heard after-
wards.]157 The fact is that you will be giving up the opportunity to use 
newly discovered evidence and to take advantage of changes in the law 
that might occur subsequent to your plea. You will be admitting guilt, 
finally and with no hope of a challenge to your conviction. Your law-
yer is required to represent you competently and if you have any ques-
tions about what you are giving up, you should talk to your lawyer 
again. I shall be happy to give you time to do so. 158 If you or your 
attorney would like to address any questions to the court, you may do 
so, and the court will endeavor to answer them. 
A defendant who pleads guilty after hearing this instruction waives 
all claims that the Supreme Court has held are lost by a plea. If the 
152. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
153. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 
(1977); Suggs v. La Vallee, 570 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962 
(5th Cir. 1978); State v. Vensel, 88 Wash. 2d 552, 564 P.2d 326 (1977). 
154. Courts always emphasize the extent of the defendant's knowledge at the time of his 
plea when evaluating the validity of a conviction based upon a guilty plea. See, e.g., Hender-
son v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Co=onwealth v. Tabb, 477 Pa. 115,383 A.2d 849 (1978). 
155. Professor Spritzer pointed out the need for special care in taking guilty pleas in 
Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural .Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
476 (1978): 
In the "guilty plea" case ... there are impressive reasons for adopting the waiver 
standard. There is no question that the rights being abandoned-the totality of rights 
associated with the criminal trial-are of the most basic character. The defendant is not 
giving up a single privilege or prerogative that might affect the result; he is forfeiting the 
entire ball game. Moreover, the setting in which the plea is tendered-a formal proceed-
ing before the judge-is one ideally suited to the kind of inquiry that the waiver principle 
dictates. Finally, it is difficult to perceive any legitimate societal interest in the acceptance 
of a plea that is the product of improper influence or misapprehension. 
156. q. Co=onwealth v. Cathey, 477 Pa. 446,384 A.2d 589 (1978) (necessity of personal 
notice of appeal rights). 
157. Or, ''you have raised several claims, but none is of the type that can be pursued fol-
lowing a guilty plea." Or perhaps, "you have raised several claims, but only the following will 
remain alive after your plea is taken." 
158. If the defendant does then consult his counsel, the judge would repeat this entire 
instruction except for this sentence and the preceding one. 
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notice feature is added, and no notice of claims is supplied by a de-
fendant, even double jeopardy and other claims that currently are 
preserved after a guilty plea also would be lost. The defendant 
waives known rights, although the details of the rights are somewhat 
uncertain. 
Thus, the guilty plea cases do not allow for the loss of rights with-
out the defendant's knowing choice. The decision to plead involves 
some degree of uncertainty, but it is still a choice. Moreover, the 
defendant makes a deliberate, informed decision. This is the pur-
pose of providing counsel. It should not be overlooked that under 
the Supreme Court's decisions, a defendant could attack any guilty 
plea on the ground that his counsel rendered inadequate service.159 
Rather than viewing the Court's decisions as involving forfeiture, 
they may be viewed as involving waiver under extremely uncertain 
circumstances. 160 
The forfeiture analysis may be more attractive where a defense 
counsel fails to raise a claim even though it existed before the plea's 
entry and where the defendant argues that he would have raised it 
had his lawyer advised him of it. If no reasonable lawyer would 
have failed either to raise or to inform his client of the claim, there is 
every reason to believe that under the Supreme Court's holdings the 
lawyer who failed to do so would be deemed ineffective and the plea 
would be set aside. When a claim is less important and a lawyer 
disregards it to work on more important issues, and a court says that 
this decision lies within the reasonable competence of a lawyer, the 
court in effect tells the criminal defendant that it may validly refuse 
to hear constitutional claims that are not raised in accordance with 
reasonable procedural rules. 
Such a judicial statement recognizes that constitutional rights 
have two parts: the underlying substantive right and the procedural 
guarantees that surround it. The Supreme Court's decisions indicate 
that once the state recognizes a substantive right, it must afford the 
criminal defendant reasonable opportunities to claim that right, and 
it must guarantee him reasonably competent" assistance in doing so. 
In the Court's view, this is all that the Constitution mandates. Even 
in this context, however, to speak of forfeiture invites error. If a de-
fendant claims that his confession is coerced, but he fails to raise that 
159. Professor Alschuler agrees that "it may be reasonable to equate a competently coun-
seled guilty plea with a knowing guilty plea." Alschuler, supra note 5, at 55. 
160. At some point, the uncertainties might be too great to have a valid waiver. Recogni-
tion of this possibility is nothing more than reiteration of the bottom line question raised in the 
text accompanying note 151 supra. 
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claim before pleading guilty, he cannot assert the claim in a later 
collateral attack on the conviction. However, if prosecuted for a sec-
ond crime to which the same confession relates, the defendant al-
most surely can move to suppress the confession. Thus, he may still 
vindicate the underlying constitutional right. Furthermore, even if 
the Ellis dissent is correctly interpreted as attacking the recognition 
of a collateral attack on a statute by one who has pleaded guilty (an 
attack cleverly posed in the nature of a civil suit), no opinion of the 
Court bars a civil suit, even by one who has pleaded guilty, against 
police officers who unconstitutionally coerce a confession. The civil 
rights suit would challenge the police officers' conduct, which is no 
more constitutional after a final conviction than before. 161 For these 
reasons, the term "forfeiture" is unhelpful in analyzing the guilty 
plea cases.162 
It is important to reject the concept of forfeiture with its implica-
tion that nothing limits the state's ability to impose hidden costs on 
criminal defendants once they choose to plead guilty. That a state 
has an interest in imposing such costs does not answer the question 
whether it may do so in the face of a subsequent challenge asserting 
the defendant's ignorance at the time of his guilty plea. The state 
always has an interest in obtaining maximum benefits at the lowest 
price from those it opposes in litigation.163 But the constitutional 
safeguards developed to protect criminal defendants suggest that the 
state can further its interest only by offering the defendant an in-
formed choice. That the choice involves uncertainty does not mean 
that no real choice exists, since, as was demonstrated above, most 
choices involve some uncertainty. Under the circumstances, the un-
certainty may be so great that the court will find it fundamentally 
unfair to accept a plea, 164 but the guilty plea cases suggest that such 
instances probably will be rare. As long as the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to choose between preserving claims and pleading 
161. One might argue that the failure to raise a claim in the first case should bar its being 
raised later. See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1978). 
But this would "push res judicata beyond where ... any court has intentionally gone." Id. at 
349-50. 
162. The defendant who pleads guilty and the defendant who goes to trial both may "lose" 
an opportunity to raise claims not raised by competent counsel. 
163. States should, of course, also realize that they have an interest in fair procedures. 
164. One of the best examples of a state's unfair exploitation of uncertainty occurs when a 
criminal defendant agrees to plead guilty if the prosecutor recommends a certain sentence, and 
the trial judge indicates he will accept the plea if the defendant understands that a different 
sentence may nonetheless be imposed. Although the defendant is aware of the uncertainty, 
almost certainly he expects the recommendation to be accepted. If it is not, the defendant 
should be allowed to replead. For an example of how outrageously far courts will go to sustain 
pleas, see Lilly v. Commonwealth, - Va.-, 243 S.E.2d 208 (1978). 
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guilty, the waiver concept governs and there is no need to recognize 
a doctrine of forfeiture. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. The Cases Reconciled 
Unlike most of the commentary on the Supreme Court's guilty 
plea cases, this Article has attempted to demonstrate that those cases 
can be reconciled. I have tried to show why the line between lost 
and preserved guilty pleas is drawn to vindicate certain constitu-
tional rights. Drawing a line between constitutional defenses 
designed in large measure to limit the imposition of litigation on 
criminal defendants and other constitutional claims not only is de-
fensible, it also makes a good deal of sense in the guilty-plea systems 
of the many jurisdictions which increasingly emphasize finality. If it 
is clear to the defendant who contemplates pleading guilty that a 
plea made with the advice of counsel competent to explain the bene-
fits and risks of going to trial is indeed final, due process concerns 
are satisfied when subsequent attempts to raise claims are rejected 
(at least as long as plea bargaining is an acceptable part of our crimi-
nal justice system). However, no matter how clearly the state stresses 
a guilty plea's finality, the defendant who pleads guilty must have 
the option of raising certain constitutional claims, like double jeop-
ardy, which are based on cost-minimization principles. Those 
claims, this Article argues, survive a guilty plea unless (1) the de-
fendant explicitly waives them when pleading; or (2) the defendant 
fails to satisfy the jurisdiction's requirement of a pre-plea notice of 
claim. 
B. The Merits of the Precedents 
With the waiver concept now in hand, it is easy to return to the 
Brady trilogy and Tollett to state the difficulty with the opinions: 
The Court assumed that the defendants who pleaded guilty in those 
cases either knew what the instruction proposed in this Article would 
have told them or that it did not matter whether they knew because 
they would have pleaded guilty anyway. Both assumptions are chal-
lengeable and should have been scrutinized in trial courts. Unless a 
defendant knows that he may lose rights and opportunities to raise 
claims, those rights cannot legitimately be taken. If the defendant 
does know, then he can properly waive them, assuming that the 
court complies with applicable procedural rules in taking the guilty 
plea. If the defendant does not know, I argue that no "forfeiture" 
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can be permitted and no waiver found. I suspect that the defendants 
in the four cases did not know. If they did not, the cases were 
wrongly decided. 
C. Plea Bargaining Generally 
One of the intriguing things about the Brady approach is that it 
reduces uncertainty (assuming that this Article has now clarified the 
distinction between claims lost following a plea and those preserved) 
on one issue-the scope of guilty-plea waiver-by suggesting that a 
guilty plea ends the line for most pleaders. (A notice requirement 
would produce even greater certainty.) Hence, it now is clear that 
the defendant considering whether to plead knows that his plea al-
most surely will be the final disposition of his case. It is also true, 
however, that when asked to relinquish all claims, including future 
ones, some increased uncertainty may complicate the defendant's 
pleading decision. A defendant will have difficulty predicting what 
future claims might be lost by pleading guilty. Yet, he must attempt 
to weigh the loss of those claims, together with the loss of present 
claims, against the benefits to be gained from pleading guilty. While 
in theory the trade-off may seem most uncertain, most defendants 
probably never would benefit from a future claim that is presently 
unavailable, since such claims are relatively uncommon. As a result, 
most defendants will know what they are giving up at the time they 
plead. And the principal effect of the guilty-plea cases will be to 
promote both certainty and finality. 
Ironically, while the Court wanted to legitimate and promote 
plea bargaining, its guilty-plea cases could undercut the current sup-
port for the concept. In truth, guilty pleas have been and will con-
tinue to be the product of largely uncontrolled bargaining. 165 
Already, dissatisfaction exists with the trade-offs prosecutors make to 
strike bargains. 166 Once the Supreme Court's decisions are recon-
ciled and properly understood, the greater finality and certainty that 
they produce may leave criminal defendants less willing to plead 
guilty. Prosecutors may respond with more generous bargaining of-
fers than heretofore, and in the long run, the increased costs to a 
defendant associated with finality may require greater prosecutorial 
165. The instructions and advice which are furnished to prosecutors still leave them with 
much room to bargain. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Materials Relating lo Prosecutorial 
.Discretion, [1978] 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001. 
166. See, e.g., Scoppetta, GellingAw'ij' with Murder: Our .Disastrous Court System, SATUR· 
DAY REv., June 10, 1978, at 10-13. 
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concessions to make a plea attractive. 167 If it is true that the hard-
ened criminal bargains most effectively, at some point the conces-
sions will be too great for the public to swallow. Moreover, the 
disparity between the sentences of those who plead and those who 
are tried may prove politically unpopular at a time when more uni-
form sentences seem to be preferred. Perhaps plea bargaining will 
be retained, but some limits may possibly be placed on its scope. 
Brady and its progeny are doctrinally consistent, as this Article 
demonstrates. But none of the Supreme Court's guilty-plea cases 
come to grip wfth "the real problems of bargained-for, justice. They 
remain for future consideration. 
167. If future defendants co=only arrange to retain certain claims after pleading guilty, 
plea bargaining may lose favor with the courts, since judges naturally want to avoid post-
conviction claims as they struggle with mounting caseloads and demanding speedy trial rules. 
It may tum out that prosecutors are satisfied to bargain for convictions that make their offices 
appear effective, even though those convictions are anything but final. This is especially true if 
the defendant who pleads guilty is likely to go to jail during post-conviction proceedings. It is 
also possible that prosecutors will prefer to bargain for "tough sentences" by arranging for 
defendants to preserve numerous post-conviction claims in exchange for a plea. None of this 
is likely to sit well with the courts. Whether the public will accept it is less clear. That may 
depend on the number of convictions overturned and the results on retrial. 
